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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-53505 — Thumbor proportion filter allows unbounded post-transform resize leading to remote DoS</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53505</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; thumbor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thumbor is an open-source photo thumbnail service by globo.com. Prior to 7.8.0, Thumbor&amp;#39;s filters:proportion(&amp;lt;value&amp;gt;) filter does not enforce an upper bound on &amp;lt;value&amp;gt; and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in 7.8.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; thumbor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thumbor is an open-source photo thumbnail service by globo.com. Prior to 7.8.0, Thumbor&amp;#39;s filters:proportion(&amp;lt;value&amp;gt;) filter does not enforce an upper bound on &amp;lt;value&amp;gt; and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in 7.8.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53505</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3621 — Thumbor proportion filter allows unbounded post-transform resize leading to remote DoS</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3621</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: thumbor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Thumbor&amp;#39;s `filters:proportion(&amp;lt;value&amp;gt;)` filter does not enforce an upper bound on `&amp;lt;value&amp;gt;` and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
- Filter implementation: `thumbor/filters/proportion.py`
  - `value` is parsed as a float (`BaseFilter.DecimalNumber`) with no maximum.
  - The filter computes `new_width = source_width * value` and `new_height = source_height * value` and then calls `engine.resize(new_width, new_height)`.
- Execution phase: `proportion` runs in the default POST_TRANSFORM phase (after the main transform pipeline). This means it can effectively bypass request-level size clamping that happens earlier in the request lifecycle (e.g., `MAX_WIDTH`/`MAX_HEIGHT` applied to `req.width/req.height`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Documentation states the `percentage` argument should be `0.0 to 1.0` (`docs/proportion.rst`), but the implementation does not enforce this constraint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
#### Preconditions
- The `proportion` filter is enabled (it is enabled by default via `BUILTIN_FILTERS`).
- Either:
  - `/unsafe/` URLs are allowed (`ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True`, common default in some deployments), OR
  - `/unsafe/` is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or otherwise can obtain signed URLs issued by a trusted signing service).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Example request 1 (signed URL)
The following request was used to reproduce the issue and…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: thumbor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
Thumbor&amp;#39;s `filters:proportion(&amp;lt;value&amp;gt;)` filter does not enforce an upper bound on `&amp;lt;value&amp;gt;` and runs in the post-transform phase. An attacker can trigger extremely large resizes (CPU/memory exhaustion) and cause denial of service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
- Filter implementation: `thumbor/filters/proportion.py`
  - `value` is parsed as a float (`BaseFilter.DecimalNumber`) with no maximum.
  - The filter computes `new_width = source_width * value` and `new_height = source_height * value` and then calls `engine.resize(new_width, new_height)`.
- Execution phase: `proportion` runs in the default POST_TRANSFORM phase (after the main transform pipeline). This means it can effectively bypass request-level size clamping that happens earlier in the request lifecycle (e.g., `MAX_WIDTH`/`MAX_HEIGHT` applied to `req.width/req.height`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Documentation states the `percentage` argument should be `0.0 to 1.0` (`docs/proportion.rst`), but the implementation does not enforce this constraint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
#### Preconditions
- The `proportion` filter is enabled (it is enabled by default via `BUILTIN_FILTERS`).
- Either:
  - `/unsafe/` URLs are allowed (`ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL=True`, common default in some deployments), OR
  - `/unsafe/` is disabled, and the attacker has a valid signed URL (i.e., the attacker is an authorized user/partner, or otherwise can obtain signed URLs issued by a trusted signing service).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Example request 1 (signed URL)
The following request was used to reproduce the issue and…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3621</guid>
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