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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-61702 — OpenPrinting CUPS: root-side banner file disclosure</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61702</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenPrinting cups&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenPrinting CUPS is an open source printing system for Linux and other Unix-like operating systems. Prior to 2.4.20, copy_banner() in scheduler/ipp.c uses the attacker-controlled IPP attributes-natural-language value as a directory component beneath DataDir/banners when processing a job-sheets banner. The job-sheets value must first match a registered banner basename, and the traversed path must contain a matching reachable basename; selecting an arbitrary target as demonstrated additionally requires pre-positioned path state such as a symlink with that basename. Subject to the scheduler&amp;#39;s filesystem and sandbox access, path separators in the language value can escape the intended banner directory, make the root scheduler open the reachable file, and copy its bytes into a job-sheet spool object that a configured backend can deliver to an attacker-observable endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.20.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenPrinting cups&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenPrinting CUPS is an open source printing system for Linux and other Unix-like operating systems. Prior to 2.4.20, copy_banner() in scheduler/ipp.c uses the attacker-controlled IPP attributes-natural-language value as a directory component beneath DataDir/banners when processing a job-sheets banner. The job-sheets value must first match a registered banner basename, and the traversed path must contain a matching reachable basename; selecting an arbitrary target as demonstrated additionally requires pre-positioned path state such as a symlink with that basename. Subject to the scheduler&amp;#39;s filesystem and sandbox access, path separators in the language value can escape the intended banner directory, make the root scheduler open the reachable file, and copy its bytes into a job-sheet spool object that a configured backend can deliver to an attacker-observable endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.20.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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