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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 21:00:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-53999 — Radius Controller May Delete a Container Resource via an Injected Deployment Annotation (Multi-Tenant Installs)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53999</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; radius-project radius&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Radius is a cloud-native, portable application platform that makes app development easier for teams building cloud-native apps. Prior to 0.58.0, the Kubernetes controller deserializes the user-controlled radapp.io/status annotation on a Deployment and uses its container resource identifier for deletion without confirming ownership by that Deployment. An attacker with permission to modify Deployment annotations and knowledge of a target Radius resource ID can forge radapp.io/status and set radapp.io/enabled to false, causing reconciliation to enter the privileged deletion path for another tenant&amp;#39;s Radius-managed container resource. In a multi-tenant installation this confused-deputy condition can delete another team&amp;#39;s recoverable container resource and disrupt service; in a single-tenant installation the impact is limited to self denial of service. The multi-tenant Radius controller reads the annotations in pkg/controller/reconciler/annotations.go and reaches the privileged delete in pkg/controller/reconciler/deployment_reconciler.go. The issue does not disclose data, grant privileges, or provide persistence. This issue is fixed in version 0.58.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; radius-project radius&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Radius is a cloud-native, portable application platform that makes app development easier for teams building cloud-native apps. Prior to 0.58.0, the Kubernetes controller deserializes the user-controlled radapp.io/status annotation on a Deployment and uses its container resource identifier for deletion without confirming ownership by that Deployment. An attacker with permission to modify Deployment annotations and knowledge of a target Radius resource ID can forge radapp.io/status and set radapp.io/enabled to false, causing reconciliation to enter the privileged deletion path for another tenant&amp;#39;s Radius-managed container resource. In a multi-tenant installation this confused-deputy condition can delete another team&amp;#39;s recoverable container resource and disrupt service; in a single-tenant installation the impact is limited to self denial of service. The multi-tenant Radius controller reads the annotations in pkg/controller/reconciler/annotations.go and reaches the privileged delete in pkg/controller/reconciler/deployment_reconciler.go. The issue does not disclose data, grant privileges, or provide persistence. This issue is fixed in version 0.58.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53999</guid>
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