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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 19:59:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-114606 — draw.io Desktop: Arbitrary local-file read via read-side IPC (no blessed-path gate)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-114606</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jgraph drawio-desktop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process&amp;#39;s read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content &amp;#34;sniff&amp;#34; and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app&amp;#39;s file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jgraph drawio-desktop&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process&amp;#39;s read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content &amp;#34;sniff&amp;#34; and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app&amp;#39;s file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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