https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 07:33:59 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-35621 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>&gt; Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The shared `/allowlist` command persists channel authorization config through `writeConfigFile(...)` but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because `chat.send` is intentionally reachable to `operator.write` callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel `allowFrom` and `groupAllowFrom` policy that direct `config.patch` correctly reserves to `operator.admin`.</p> <p>This is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared `/config` and `/plugins` writes, but `/allowlist` was left behind.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>The gateway&#39;s documented scope split is clear:</p> <p>- `chat.send` is a write-scoped action. - direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.</p> <p>The vulnerable path is:</p> <p>1. A gateway client authenticates with `operator.write`. 2. The client calls `chat.send`, which is intentionally allowed for that scope. 3. `chat.send` builds an internal message context with `CommandAuthorized: true` and carries `GatewayClientScopes` into the reply pipeline. 4. `resolveCommandAuthorization(...)` converts that internal message into `isAuthorizedSender=true` in the common case where no stricter `commands.allowFrom` override is configured. 5. `/allowlist add|remove` accepts that generic command authorization and p…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p> <p>&gt; Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.24, the current shipping release.</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The shared `/allowlist` command persists channel authorization config through `writeConfigFile(...)` but does not re-validate gateway client scopes for internal gateway callers. Because `chat.send` is intentionally reachable to `operator.write` callers and still creates a generic command-authorized internal context, an authenticated write-scoped gateway client can indirectly mutate channel `allowFrom` and `groupAllowFrom` policy that direct `config.patch` correctly reserves to `operator.admin`.</p> <p>This is not just a generic code smell. The current code already shows the intended boundary by adding sink-side internal admin checks to shared `/config` and `/plugins` writes, but `/allowlist` was left behind.</p> <p>## Details</p> <p>The gateway&#39;s documented scope split is clear:</p> <p>- `chat.send` is a write-scoped action. - direct config mutation is an admin-scoped action.</p> <p>The vulnerable path is:</p> <p>1. A gateway client authenticates with `operator.write`. 2. The client calls `chat.send`, which is intentionally allowed for that scope. 3. `chat.send` builds an internal message context with `CommandAuthorized: true` and carries `GatewayClientScopes` into the reply pipeline. 4. `resolveCommandAuthorization(...)` converts that internal message into `isAuthorizedSender=true` in the common case where no stricter `commands.allowFrom` override is configured. 5. `/allowlist add|remove` accepts that generic command authorization and p…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-35621 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-35621 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where the /allowlist command fails to re-validate gateway client scopes for internal callers, allowing operator.write-scoped clients to mutate channel authorization policy. Attackers can exploit chat.send to build an internal command-authorized context and persist channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy changes reserved for operator.admin scope.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p> <p>OpenClaw before 2026.3.24 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability where the /allowlist command fails to re-validate gateway client scopes for internal callers, allowing operator.write-scoped clients to mutate channel authorization policy. Attackers can exploit chat.send to build an internal command-authorized context and persist channel allowFrom and groupAllowFrom policy changes reserved for operator.admin scope.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-35621