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      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-943q-mwmv-hhvh — OpenClaw: Gateway /tools/invoke tool escalation + ACP permission auto-approval</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-943q-mwmv-hhvh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw Gateway exposes an authenticated HTTP endpoint (`POST /tools/invoke`) intended for invoking a constrained set of tools. Two issues could combine to significantly increase blast radius in misconfigured or exposed deployments:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- The HTTP gateway layer did not deny high-risk session orchestration tools by default, allowing a caller with Gateway auth to invoke tools like `sessions_spawn` / `sessions_send` and pivot into creating or controlling agent sessions.
- ACP clients could auto-approve permission requests for risky tools with insufficient user interaction/guardrails, reducing the friction that should normally prevent silent execution or mutation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the Gateway is reachable by an attacker and they obtain a valid Gateway token, they may be able to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Escalate from single-tool invocation to spawning/controlling sessions and reach command execution capabilities depending on tool policy and runtime environment.
- Perform cross-session message injection via `sessions_send`.
- In ACP-integrated scenarios, obtain unintended approvals for non-read/search tool permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## CVSS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` (8.8)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `openclaw &amp;lt; 2026.2.14`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fixed in&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `openclaw &amp;gt;= 2026.2.14`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Remediation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default behavior is now hardened:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR #15390: deny high-risk tools over HTTP `/tools/invoke` by default (with `gateway.tools.{allow,deny}` overrides) and harden ACP permission handling.
- Commit `bb1c3dfe1…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw Gateway exposes an authenticated HTTP endpoint (`POST /tools/invoke`) intended for invoking a constrained set of tools. Two issues could combine to significantly increase blast radius in misconfigured or exposed deployments:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- The HTTP gateway layer did not deny high-risk session orchestration tools by default, allowing a caller with Gateway auth to invoke tools like `sessions_spawn` / `sessions_send` and pivot into creating or controlling agent sessions.
- ACP clients could auto-approve permission requests for risky tools with insufficient user interaction/guardrails, reducing the friction that should normally prevent silent execution or mutation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the Gateway is reachable by an attacker and they obtain a valid Gateway token, they may be able to:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Escalate from single-tool invocation to spawning/controlling sessions and reach command execution capabilities depending on tool policy and runtime environment.
- Perform cross-session message injection via `sessions_send`.
- In ACP-integrated scenarios, obtain unintended approvals for non-read/search tool permissions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## CVSS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` (8.8)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `openclaw &amp;lt; 2026.2.14`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fixed in&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `openclaw &amp;gt;= 2026.2.14`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Remediation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default behavior is now hardened:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- PR #15390: deny high-risk tools over HTTP `/tools/invoke` by default (with `gateway.tools.{allow,deny}` overrides) and harden ACP permission handling.
- Commit `bb1c3dfe1…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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