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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 02:51:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-28393 — OpenClaw's hook transform module path allows traversal and arbitrary JavaScript module loading</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-28393</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw hook mapping transforms could be loaded via absolute paths or `..` traversal, allowing arbitrary JavaScript module loading/execution in the gateway process when an attacker can modify hooks configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Affected: &amp;gt;= 2.0.0-beta3 and &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13
- Fixed: 2026.2.14&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`hooks.mappings[].transform.module` is dynamically imported and executed during webhook processing. Path resolution previously accepted absolute paths and did not enforce containment for relative paths, so a config-controlled transform could resolve outside the intended transforms directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If an attacker can write the OpenClaw config (or otherwise update hooks config through authenticated configuration mechanisms), they could point a hook mapping transform at an arbitrary module on disk and execute code with the gateway process privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Reproduction (config-controlled module load)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Configure a hook mapping that points to a transform path that escapes the transforms directory (for example via `..` traversal).
2. Place a malicious ESM module at the resolved location that executes arbitrary code in the gateway process.
3. Trigger the hook endpoint with the correct hook token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Transform loading is now constrained to the OpenClaw transforms root directory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Root: `~/.openclaw/hooks/transforms`
- `hooks.transformsDir` must be within that directory
- `transform.module` must be within the selected transforms directory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attempts t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw hook mapping transforms could be loaded via absolute paths or `..` traversal, allowing arbitrary JavaScript module loading/execution in the gateway process when an attacker can modify hooks configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Affected: &amp;gt;= 2.0.0-beta3 and &amp;lt;= 2026.2.13
- Fixed: 2026.2.14&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`hooks.mappings[].transform.module` is dynamically imported and executed during webhook processing. Path resolution previously accepted absolute paths and did not enforce containment for relative paths, so a config-controlled transform could resolve outside the intended transforms directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If an attacker can write the OpenClaw config (or otherwise update hooks config through authenticated configuration mechanisms), they could point a hook mapping transform at an arbitrary module on disk and execute code with the gateway process privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Reproduction (config-controlled module load)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Configure a hook mapping that points to a transform path that escapes the transforms directory (for example via `..` traversal).
2. Place a malicious ESM module at the resolved location that executes arbitrary code in the gateway process.
3. Trigger the hook endpoint with the correct hook token.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Transform loading is now constrained to the OpenClaw transforms root directory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Root: `~/.openclaw/hooks/transforms`
- `hooks.transformsDir` must be within that directory
- `transform.module` must be within the selected transforms directory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attempts t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-28393</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-28393 — OpenClaw 2.0.0-beta3 &lt; 2026.2.14 - Arbitrary JavaScript Module Loading via Hook Transform Path Traversal</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-28393</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions 2.0.0-beta3 prior to 2026.2.14 contain a path traversal vulnerability in hook transform module loading that allows arbitrary JavaScript execution. The hooks.mappings[].transform.module parameter accepts absolute paths and traversal sequences, enabling attackers with configuration write access to load and execute malicious modules with gateway process privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions 2.0.0-beta3 prior to 2026.2.14 contain a path traversal vulnerability in hook transform module loading that allows arbitrary JavaScript execution. The hooks.mappings[].transform.module parameter accepts absolute paths and traversal sequences, enabling attackers with configuration write access to load and execute malicious modules with gateway process privileges.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-28393</guid>
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