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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 22:39:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-32009 — OpenClaw: safeBins static default trusted dirs allow writable-dir binary hijack (`jq`)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-32009</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In `openclaw&amp;lt;=2026.2.23`, safe-bin trust in allowlist mode relied on static default trusted directories that included package-manager paths (notably `/opt/homebrew/bin` and `/usr/local/bin`).
When a same-name binary (for example `jq`) is placed in one of those trusted default directories, safe-bin evaluation can be satisfied and execute the attacker-controlled binary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
This is an exec allowlist `safeBins` policy bypass that can lead to command execution in the OpenClaw runtime context.
Severity is set to Medium given the required ability to write into trusted host binary directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Vulnerable versions: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.23`
- Patched versions: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.24` (planned next npm release)
- Latest published npm version at triage time (2026-02-24): `2026.2.23`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause
- Default safe-bin trusted directories included package-manager/user-managed paths.
- Trust decision was directory-membership only for resolved executable paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Remediation
- Restrict default safe-bin trusted directories to immutable system paths: `/bin`, `/usr/bin`.
- Require explicit operator opt-in for package-manager/user paths via `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)
- `b67e600bff696ff2ed9b470826590c0ce6b3bb0a`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.24`).
Once npm release `2026.2.24` is published, this advisory should be ready for publish without ad…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In `openclaw&amp;lt;=2026.2.23`, safe-bin trust in allowlist mode relied on static default trusted directories that included package-manager paths (notably `/opt/homebrew/bin` and `/usr/local/bin`).
When a same-name binary (for example `jq`) is placed in one of those trusted default directories, safe-bin evaluation can be satisfied and execute the attacker-controlled binary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
This is an exec allowlist `safeBins` policy bypass that can lead to command execution in the OpenClaw runtime context.
Severity is set to Medium given the required ability to write into trusted host binary directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Vulnerable versions: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.23`
- Patched versions: `&amp;gt;= 2026.2.24` (planned next npm release)
- Latest published npm version at triage time (2026-02-24): `2026.2.23`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause
- Default safe-bin trusted directories included package-manager/user-managed paths.
- Trust decision was directory-membership only for resolved executable paths.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Remediation
- Restrict default safe-bin trusted directories to immutable system paths: `/bin`, `/usr/bin`.
- Require explicit operator opt-in for package-manager/user paths via `tools.exec.safeBinTrustedDirs`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Fix Commit(s)
- `b67e600bff696ff2ed9b470826590c0ce6b3bb0a`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Release Process Note
`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.24`).
Once npm release `2026.2.24` is published, this advisory should be ready for publish without ad…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-32009</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-32009 — OpenClaw &lt; 2026.2.24 - Binary Hijacking via Static Default Trusted Directories in safeBins</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-32009</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.24 contain a policy bypass vulnerability in the safeBins allowlist evaluation that trusts static default directories including writable package-manager paths like /opt/homebrew/bin and /usr/local/bin. An attacker with write access to these trusted directories can place a malicious binary with the same name as an allowed executable to achieve arbitrary command execution within the OpenClaw runtime context.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenClaw&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.24 contain a policy bypass vulnerability in the safeBins allowlist evaluation that trusts static default directories including writable package-manager paths like /opt/homebrew/bin and /usr/local/bin. An attacker with write access to these trusted directories can place a malicious binary with the same name as an allowed executable to achieve arbitrary command execution within the OpenClaw runtime context.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-32009</guid>
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