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      <title>CVE-2026-55253 — LangChain MongoDB: NoSQL Operator Injection in MongoDBSaver.list() leading to cross-tenant data exposure</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-55253</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; langchain-ai langchain-mongodb, langchain-ai langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb, langchain-ai langgraph-store-mongodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LangChain MongoDB provides integrations between MongoDB, Atlas, LangChain, and LangGraph. Prior to langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb 0.3.0 and langgraph-store-mongodb 0.4.0, MongoDBSaver.list(), MongoDBSaver.alist(), and MongoDBStore.search() incorporate filter dictionaries into MongoDB queries without recursively rejecting keys prefixed with $. An authenticated caller who controls a filter argument through HTTP query parameters, request body fields, or agent tool arguments can inject MongoDB Query Language operators such as $regex or $where. In a multi-tenant deployment that uses the filter to enforce per-user or per-tenant isolation, injected operators can bypass intended equality filtering and expose other tenants&amp;#39; checkpoint or store data. Filters constructed entirely from trusted server-side values have lower practical risk. This issue is fixed in langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb 0.3.0 and langgraph-store-mongodb 0.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; langchain-ai langchain-mongodb, langchain-ai langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb, langchain-ai langgraph-store-mongodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LangChain MongoDB provides integrations between MongoDB, Atlas, LangChain, and LangGraph. Prior to langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb 0.3.0 and langgraph-store-mongodb 0.4.0, MongoDBSaver.list(), MongoDBSaver.alist(), and MongoDBStore.search() incorporate filter dictionaries into MongoDB queries without recursively rejecting keys prefixed with $. An authenticated caller who controls a filter argument through HTTP query parameters, request body fields, or agent tool arguments can inject MongoDB Query Language operators such as $regex or $where. In a multi-tenant deployment that uses the filter to enforce per-user or per-tenant isolation, injected operators can bypass intended equality filtering and expose other tenants&amp;#39; checkpoint or store data. Filters constructed entirely from trusted server-side values have lower practical risk. This issue is fixed in langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb 0.3.0 and langgraph-store-mongodb 0.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-55253</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3859 — LangChain MongoDB has NoSQL Operator Injection in MongoDBSaver.list() leading to cross-tenant data exposure</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3859</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Executive Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A NoSQL injection issue exists in the langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb and
langgraph-store-mongodb libraries. MongoDBSaver.list() and MongoDBStore.search() methods
accept a filter parameter that is incorporated into MongoDB queries without sufficient validation.
Because MongoDB query operator keys (those prefixed with $) are not rejected during filter
construction, a caller with control of the filter input can embed MongoDB query operators
directly into the query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## CVSS Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### CVSS 4.0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| **CVSS Version** | 4.0 |
| **Vector String** | `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N` |
| **Base Score** | **7.1 (High)** |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Triggerable remotely via API |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | No special conditions required |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None | No prerequisite deployment or execution conditions |
| Privileges Required (PR) | Low | Authenticated caller of the checkpoint/store API |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No user action required |
| Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC) | None | No direct impact on the vulnerable component itself |
| Vulnerable System Integrity (VI) | None | Read-only access |
| Vulnerable System Availability (VA) | None | No service disruption |
| Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC) | High | Full access to other tenants&amp;#39; checkpoint data |
| Subsequent System Integrity (SI) | None | No wr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Executive Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A NoSQL injection issue exists in the langgraph-checkpoint-mongodb and
langgraph-store-mongodb libraries. MongoDBSaver.list() and MongoDBStore.search() methods
accept a filter parameter that is incorporated into MongoDB queries without sufficient validation.
Because MongoDB query operator keys (those prefixed with $) are not rejected during filter
construction, a caller with control of the filter input can embed MongoDB query operators
directly into the query.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## CVSS Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### CVSS 4.0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| **CVSS Version** | 4.0 |
| **Vector String** | `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N` |
| **Base Score** | **7.1 (High)** |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Triggerable remotely via API |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | No special conditions required |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None | No prerequisite deployment or execution conditions |
| Privileges Required (PR) | Low | Authenticated caller of the checkpoint/store API |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No user action required |
| Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC) | None | No direct impact on the vulnerable component itself |
| Vulnerable System Integrity (VI) | None | Read-only access |
| Vulnerable System Availability (VA) | None | No service disruption |
| Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC) | High | Full access to other tenants&amp;#39; checkpoint data |
| Subsequent System Integrity (SI) | None | No wr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3859</guid>
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