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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 11:10:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-55784 — free5GC AUSF authentication contexts can be overwritten by concurrent requests for the same SUPI</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-55784</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; free5gc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In version 1.4.4 and earlier, the AUSF component stores per-subscriber authentication state in a global sync.Map named AUSFContext.UePool in internal/context/context.go, keyed only by SUPI. Every request handled by internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go creates an AusfUeContext, and AddAusfUeContextToPool executes ausfContext.UePool.Store(ausfUeContext.Supi, ausfUeContext), unconditionally replacing the active context for that SUPI. An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can send concurrent POST /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications requests for the same target SUPI, causing all attempts to share one logical authentication context URL while K_aut, XRES, and EapID are repeatedly overwritten. A valid EAP-AKA&amp;#39; response for an earlier challenge is then checked against the latest context, causing AT_MAC verification to fail and denying authentication to the selected subscriber while the request flood continues. No fixed version is available as of this review.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; free5gc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;free5GC is an open-source implementation of the 5G core network. In version 1.4.4 and earlier, the AUSF component stores per-subscriber authentication state in a global sync.Map named AUSFContext.UePool in internal/context/context.go, keyed only by SUPI. Every request handled by internal/sbi/processor/ue_authentication.go creates an AusfUeContext, and AddAusfUeContextToPool executes ausfContext.UePool.Store(ausfUeContext.Supi, ausfUeContext), unconditionally replacing the active context for that SUPI. An attacker with access to the AUSF SBI/N12 interface can send concurrent POST /nausf-auth/v1/ue-authentications requests for the same target SUPI, causing all attempts to share one logical authentication context URL while K_aut, XRES, and EapID are repeatedly overwritten. A valid EAP-AKA&amp;#39; response for an earlier challenge is then checked against the latest context, causing AT_MAC verification to fail and denying authentication to the selected subscriber while the request flood continues. No fixed version is available as of this review.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-55784</guid>
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