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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 19:22:42 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-dvc-CVE-2026-54591 — asyncssh has SCP Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Write</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-dvc-cve-2026-54591</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: dvc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| | |
|---|---|
| Product | asyncssh (all versions through 2.23.0) |
| Related | CVE-2019-6111 (same class in OpenSSH) |
| Fix | AsyncSSH 2.23.1 |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious SSH server can write arbitrary files on the asyncssh SCP client&amp;#39;s filesystem by sending filenames containing `../` traversal sequences. The SCP receive path does not currently sanitize server-provided filenames. By chaining directory traversals via the `D` (directory) action, an attacker can escape any target directory and overwrite `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/rc`, or `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, achieving code execution. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2019-6111. The mitigation applied in OpenSSH does not appear to have been adopted in asyncssh.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Steps to exploit:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 1 - Normal usage:** Application calls `await asyncssh.scp((conn, &amp;#39;file&amp;#39;), &amp;#39;/home/user/downloads/&amp;#39;)`. This is the standard, documented API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 2 - SCP protocol:** asyncssh opens an SSH exec channel, runs `scp -f file`. The server controls the filename field:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
C0644 100 ../pwned.txt\n       (simple traversal)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;D0755 0 ..\n                   (traverse up, repeat as needed)
C0644 47 .bashrc\n             (write payload)
E\n
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 3 - `_parse_cd_args`** (`scp.py:134-142`) returns the filename verbatim:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _parse_cd_args(args: bytes) -&amp;gt; Tuple[int, int, bytes]:
    permissions, size, name = args.split(None, 2)
    return int(permissions, 8), int(size), name  # no sanitization
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The returned `name` is not passed thro…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: dvc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| | |
|---|---|
| Product | asyncssh (all versions through 2.23.0) |
| Related | CVE-2019-6111 (same class in OpenSSH) |
| Fix | AsyncSSH 2.23.1 |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious SSH server can write arbitrary files on the asyncssh SCP client&amp;#39;s filesystem by sending filenames containing `../` traversal sequences. The SCP receive path does not currently sanitize server-provided filenames. By chaining directory traversals via the `D` (directory) action, an attacker can escape any target directory and overwrite `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/rc`, or `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, achieving code execution. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2019-6111. The mitigation applied in OpenSSH does not appear to have been adopted in asyncssh.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Steps to exploit:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 1 - Normal usage:** Application calls `await asyncssh.scp((conn, &amp;#39;file&amp;#39;), &amp;#39;/home/user/downloads/&amp;#39;)`. This is the standard, documented API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 2 - SCP protocol:** asyncssh opens an SSH exec channel, runs `scp -f file`. The server controls the filename field:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
C0644 100 ../pwned.txt\n       (simple traversal)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;D0755 0 ..\n                   (traverse up, repeat as needed)
C0644 47 .bashrc\n             (write payload)
E\n
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 3 - `_parse_cd_args`** (`scp.py:134-142`) returns the filename verbatim:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _parse_cd_args(args: bytes) -&amp;gt; Tuple[int, int, bytes]:
    permissions, size, name = args.split(None, 2)
    return int(permissions, 8), int(size), name  # no sanitization
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The returned `name` is not passed thro…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/brew-dvc-cve-2026-54591</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-54591 — AsyncSSH: SCP Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Write</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-54591</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ronf asyncssh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AsyncSSH is a Python package which provides an asynchronous client and server implementation of the SSHv2 protocol on top of the Python asyncio framework. Prior to 2.23.1, a malicious SSH server can write arbitrary files on the asyncssh SCP client&amp;#39;s filesystem by sending filenames containing ../ traversal sequences because _parse_cd_args in scp.py returns server-provided names verbatim and _recv_files joins them to the destination path without enforcing the target directory boundary. This issue is fixed in version 2.23.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ronf asyncssh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AsyncSSH is a Python package which provides an asynchronous client and server implementation of the SSHv2 protocol on top of the Python asyncio framework. Prior to 2.23.1, a malicious SSH server can write arbitrary files on the asyncssh SCP client&amp;#39;s filesystem by sending filenames containing ../ traversal sequences because _parse_cd_args in scp.py returns server-provided names verbatim and _recv_files joins them to the destination path without enforcing the target directory boundary. This issue is fixed in version 2.23.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-54591</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3808 — asyncssh has SCP Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Write</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3808</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: asyncssh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| | |
|---|---|
| Product | asyncssh (all versions through 2.23.0) |
| Related | CVE-2019-6111 (same class in OpenSSH) |
| Fix | AsyncSSH 2.23.1 |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious SSH server can write arbitrary files on the asyncssh SCP client&amp;#39;s filesystem by sending filenames containing `../` traversal sequences. The SCP receive path does not currently sanitize server-provided filenames. By chaining directory traversals via the `D` (directory) action, an attacker can escape any target directory and overwrite `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/rc`, or `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, achieving code execution. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2019-6111. The mitigation applied in OpenSSH does not appear to have been adopted in asyncssh.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Steps to exploit:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 1 - Normal usage:** Application calls `await asyncssh.scp((conn, &amp;#39;file&amp;#39;), &amp;#39;/home/user/downloads/&amp;#39;)`. This is the standard, documented API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 2 - SCP protocol:** asyncssh opens an SSH exec channel, runs `scp -f file`. The server controls the filename field:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
C0644 100 ../pwned.txt\n       (simple traversal)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;D0755 0 ..\n                   (traverse up, repeat as needed)
C0644 47 .bashrc\n             (write payload)
E\n
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 3 - `_parse_cd_args`** (`scp.py:134-142`) returns the filename verbatim:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _parse_cd_args(args: bytes) -&amp;gt; Tuple[int, int, bytes]:
    permissions, size, name = args.split(None, 2)
    return int(permissions, 8), int(size), name  # no sanitization
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The returned `name` is not passed thro…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: asyncssh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| | |
|---|---|
| Product | asyncssh (all versions through 2.23.0) |
| Related | CVE-2019-6111 (same class in OpenSSH) |
| Fix | AsyncSSH 2.23.1 |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A malicious SSH server can write arbitrary files on the asyncssh SCP client&amp;#39;s filesystem by sending filenames containing `../` traversal sequences. The SCP receive path does not currently sanitize server-provided filenames. By chaining directory traversals via the `D` (directory) action, an attacker can escape any target directory and overwrite `~/.bashrc`, `~/.ssh/rc`, or `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, achieving code execution. This is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2019-6111. The mitigation applied in OpenSSH does not appear to have been adopted in asyncssh.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Steps to exploit:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 1 - Normal usage:** Application calls `await asyncssh.scp((conn, &amp;#39;file&amp;#39;), &amp;#39;/home/user/downloads/&amp;#39;)`. This is the standard, documented API.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 2 - SCP protocol:** asyncssh opens an SSH exec channel, runs `scp -f file`. The server controls the filename field:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
C0644 100 ../pwned.txt\n       (simple traversal)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;D0755 0 ..\n                   (traverse up, repeat as needed)
C0644 47 .bashrc\n             (write payload)
E\n
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Step 3 - `_parse_cd_args`** (`scp.py:134-142`) returns the filename verbatim:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
def _parse_cd_args(args: bytes) -&amp;gt; Tuple[int, int, bytes]:
    permissions, size, name = args.split(None, 2)
    return int(permissions, 8), int(size), name  # no sanitization
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The returned `name` is not passed thro…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3808</guid>
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