<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 21:06:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-61435 — PraisonAI before 4.6.78 Authentication Bypass via Host Header Spoofing</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61435</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI before 4.6.78 contains an authentication bypass in the Call API agent invocation endpoints (src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py) when PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is configured. The safeguard intended to restrict the disabled-auth opt-out to localhost binding derives the bind host from request.url.hostname, which is taken from the client-controlled HTTP Host header. A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the service over the network can send a spoofed &amp;#39;Host: 127.0.0.1&amp;#39; header to bypass the localhost-only restriction and list (GET /api/v1/agents) and invoke (POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke) registered agents without authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison PraisonAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI before 4.6.78 contains an authentication bypass in the Call API agent invocation endpoints (src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py) when PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is configured. The safeguard intended to restrict the disabled-auth opt-out to localhost binding derives the bind host from request.url.hostname, which is taken from the client-controlled HTTP Host header. A remote, unauthenticated attacker who can reach the service over the network can send a spoofed &amp;#39;Host: 127.0.0.1&amp;#39; header to bypass the localhost-only restriction and list (GET /api/v1/agents) and invoke (POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke) registered agents without authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61435</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-4247 — PraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4247</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s patched `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` safeguard for the n8n/call agent invocation API can be bypassed with a spoofed `Host: 127.0.0.1` header, allowing an unauthenticated network caller to list and invoke registered agents when the service is reachable and the opt-out is enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected code is `src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py`. `verify_token()` is used as a FastAPI dependency for the `/api/v1/agents` routes, including `POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke`. Current code no longer unconditionally skips authentication when `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled`; it tries to allow that opt-out only for localhost binding:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
_LOCALHOST_HOSTS = frozenset({&amp;#39;127.0.0.1&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;localhost&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;::1&amp;#39;})&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def _bind_host_from_request(request: Request) -&amp;gt; str:
    host = getattr(getattr(request, &amp;#39;url&amp;#39;, None), &amp;#39;hostname&amp;#39;, None)
    return host or os.getenv(&amp;#39;PRAISONAI_CALL_BIND_HOST&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;127.0.0.1&amp;#39;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;async def verify_token(request: Request, authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)) -&amp;gt; None:
    if _call_auth_disabled():
        bind_host = _bind_host_from_request(request)
        if bind_host not in _LOCALHOST_HOSTS:
            raise HTTPException(
                status_code=503,
                detail=&amp;#34;PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is only permitted for localhost binding&amp;#34;,
            )
        return
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The violated invariant is that &amp;#34;localhost binding&amp;#34; m…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: praisonai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI&amp;#39;s patched `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled` safeguard for the n8n/call agent invocation API can be bypassed with a spoofed `Host: 127.0.0.1` header, allowing an unauthenticated network caller to list and invoke registered agents when the service is reachable and the opt-out is enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The affected code is `src/praisonai/praisonai/api/agent_invoke.py`. `verify_token()` is used as a FastAPI dependency for the `/api/v1/agents` routes, including `POST /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/invoke`. Current code no longer unconditionally skips authentication when `PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled`; it tries to allow that opt-out only for localhost binding:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
_LOCALHOST_HOSTS = frozenset({&amp;#39;127.0.0.1&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;localhost&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;::1&amp;#39;})&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;def _bind_host_from_request(request: Request) -&amp;gt; str:
    host = getattr(getattr(request, &amp;#39;url&amp;#39;, None), &amp;#39;hostname&amp;#39;, None)
    return host or os.getenv(&amp;#39;PRAISONAI_CALL_BIND_HOST&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;127.0.0.1&amp;#39;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;async def verify_token(request: Request, authorization: Optional[str] = Header(None)) -&amp;gt; None:
    if _call_auth_disabled():
        bind_host = _bind_host_from_request(request)
        if bind_host not in _LOCALHOST_HOSTS:
            raise HTTPException(
                status_code=503,
                detail=&amp;#34;PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled is only permitted for localhost binding&amp;#34;,
            )
        return
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The violated invariant is that &amp;#34;localhost binding&amp;#34; m…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-4247</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
