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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:04:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99710</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99710</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: x86/mmu: Cap number of parent PTEs per SP at 1000 (the arbitrary rmap limit)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When potentially reusing a shadow page, zap the shadow page if its number
of parent PTEs exceeds KVM&amp;#39;s (mostly) arbitrary rmap recycling threshold.
Letting the guest create a (mostly) unbounded number of parent PTEs allows
the guest to coerce KVM into creating lists containing millions of PTEs,
effectively bounded only by the maximum number of shadow pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because PTE lists are simple singly linked lists, removal is O(n).  Even
worse, if a list is constructed just so, teardown can be O(n^2), e.g. if
SPTEs are built such that zapping child SPTEs always zaps the last entry
in the list.  To cap things off, all paths that walk PTE lists do so
while holding mmu_lock, without conditionally rescheduling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Using a doubly linked list would not address the issue, as removal would
remain O(n) since KVM still wouldn&amp;#39;t know where in the list to remove from.
Removal could be made O(1) by storing a per-SPTE pointer, but that would
largely defeat the purpose of reusing SPs, and would penalize well-behaved
guests, especially for nested TDP where aliasing page tables is uncommon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So, cap the maximum number of parent PTEs at the rmap limit.  In practice,
well-behaved guests will likely never run afoul of the limit.  E.g. when
running Linux as L1 with TDP, the number of parent PTEs for a single SP
tops out at under 200 (though undoubtedly obs…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: x86/mmu: Cap number of parent PTEs per SP at 1000 (the arbitrary rmap limit)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When potentially reusing a shadow page, zap the shadow page if its number
of parent PTEs exceeds KVM&amp;#39;s (mostly) arbitrary rmap recycling threshold.
Letting the guest create a (mostly) unbounded number of parent PTEs allows
the guest to coerce KVM into creating lists containing millions of PTEs,
effectively bounded only by the maximum number of shadow pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because PTE lists are simple singly linked lists, removal is O(n).  Even
worse, if a list is constructed just so, teardown can be O(n^2), e.g. if
SPTEs are built such that zapping child SPTEs always zaps the last entry
in the list.  To cap things off, all paths that walk PTE lists do so
while holding mmu_lock, without conditionally rescheduling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Using a doubly linked list would not address the issue, as removal would
remain O(n) since KVM still wouldn&amp;#39;t know where in the list to remove from.
Removal could be made O(1) by storing a per-SPTE pointer, but that would
largely defeat the purpose of reusing SPs, and would penalize well-behaved
guests, especially for nested TDP where aliasing page tables is uncommon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So, cap the maximum number of parent PTEs at the rmap limit.  In practice,
well-behaved guests will likely never run afoul of the limit.  E.g. when
running Linux as L1 with TDP, the number of parent PTEs for a single SP
tops out at under 200 (though undoubtedly obs…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99710</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hqqf-mx5q-g7pm</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-hqqf-mx5q-g7pm</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: x86/mmu: Cap number of parent PTEs per SP at 1000 (the arbitrary rmap limit)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When potentially reusing a shadow page, zap the shadow page if its number
of parent PTEs exceeds KVM&amp;#39;s (mostly) arbitrary rmap recycling threshold.
Letting the guest create a (mostly) unbounded number of parent PTEs allows
the guest to coerce KVM into creating lists containing millions of PTEs,
effectively bounded only by the maximum number of shadow pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because PTE lists are simple singly linked lists, removal is O(n).  Even
worse, if a list is constructed just so, teardown can be O(n^2), e.g. if
SPTEs are built such that zapping child SPTEs always zaps the last entry
in the list.  To cap things off, all paths that walk PTE lists do so
while holding mmu_lock, without conditionally rescheduling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Using a doubly linked list would not address the issue, as removal would
remain O(n) since KVM still wouldn&amp;#39;t know where in the list to remove from.
Removal could be made O(1) by storing a per-SPTE pointer, but that would
largely defeat the purpose of reusing SPs, and would penalize well-behaved
guests, especially for nested TDP where aliasing page tables is uncommon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So, cap the maximum number of parent PTEs at the rmap limit.  In practice,
well-behaved guests will likely never run afoul of the limit.  E.g. when
running Linux as L1 with TDP, the number of parent PTEs for a single SP
tops out at under 200 (though undoubtedly obs…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;KVM: x86/mmu: Cap number of parent PTEs per SP at 1000 (the arbitrary rmap limit)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When potentially reusing a shadow page, zap the shadow page if its number
of parent PTEs exceeds KVM&amp;#39;s (mostly) arbitrary rmap recycling threshold.
Letting the guest create a (mostly) unbounded number of parent PTEs allows
the guest to coerce KVM into creating lists containing millions of PTEs,
effectively bounded only by the maximum number of shadow pages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because PTE lists are simple singly linked lists, removal is O(n).  Even
worse, if a list is constructed just so, teardown can be O(n^2), e.g. if
SPTEs are built such that zapping child SPTEs always zaps the last entry
in the list.  To cap things off, all paths that walk PTE lists do so
while holding mmu_lock, without conditionally rescheduling.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Using a doubly linked list would not address the issue, as removal would
remain O(n) since KVM still wouldn&amp;#39;t know where in the list to remove from.
Removal could be made O(1) by storing a per-SPTE pointer, but that would
largely defeat the purpose of reusing SPs, and would penalize well-behaved
guests, especially for nested TDP where aliasing page tables is uncommon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So, cap the maximum number of parent PTEs at the rmap limit.  In practice,
well-behaved guests will likely never run afoul of the limit.  E.g. when
running Linux as L1 with TDP, the number of parent PTEs for a single SP
tops out at under 200 (though undoubtedly obs…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-hqqf-mx5q-g7pm</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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