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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 07:05:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99249</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99249</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits
until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the
namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids
allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every
suspend attempt fails:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which
returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer&amp;#39;s fake signal; the loop then clears
TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop
sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING
there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt
and the task spins until the wait ends.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the
freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE |
TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the
threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does
not reap those killed during the dump.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits
until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the
namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids
allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every
suspend attempt fails:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which
returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer&amp;#39;s fake signal; the loop then clears
TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop
sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING
there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt
and the task spins until the wait ends.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the
freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE |
TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the
threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does
not reap those killed during the dump.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99249</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mgg4-g6ph-qf96</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mgg4-g6ph-qf96</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits
until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the
namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids
allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every
suspend attempt fails:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which
returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer&amp;#39;s fake signal; the loop then clears
TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop
sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING
there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt
and the task spins until the wait ends.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the
freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE |
TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the
threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does
not reap those killed during the dump.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits
until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the
namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids
allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every
suspend attempt fails:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which
returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer&amp;#39;s fake signal; the loop then clears
TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop
sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING
there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt
and the task spins until the wait ends.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the
freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE |
TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the
threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does
not reap those killed during the dump.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mgg4-g6ph-qf96</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-99249</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99249</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 257 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every suspend attempt fails:   Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0): Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer&amp;#39;s fake signal; the loop then clears TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt and the task spins until the wait ends. Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does. This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does not reap those killed during the dump.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 257 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every suspend attempt fails:   Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0): Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer&amp;#39;s fake signal; the loop then clears TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt and the task spins until the wait ends. Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does. This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does not reap those killed during the dump.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99249</guid>
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