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fkie_cve-2026-99010

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: RFCOMM: free the skb when the DLC has no owner

rfcomm_recv_data() hands the skb to d->data_ready() and returns 0 without freeing it, so the callback owns the skb from that point on. The tty implementation frees it when the DLC has been detached from its device:

static void rfcomm_dev_data_ready(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner;

if (!dev) { kfree_skb(skb); return; }

The socket implementation returns without freeing it, and the skb is leaked.

A connected DLC can have no owner: rfcomm_sock_destruct() clears d->owner, while the DLC itself stays on the session until it is closed. Data frames that arrive in that window still find d->state == BT_CONNECTED in rfcomm_recv_data() and are handed to the callback, one leaked skb each.

The leak does not stop on its own either. The remote runs out of credits only once RFCOMM_RX_THROTTLED is set, and for a socket the only place that sets it is rfcomm_sk_data_ready() itself, below the return. rfcomm_process_dlcs() keeps granting credits, so the remote keeps sending and the leak keeps growing.

Free the skb, as the tty side does.

GHSA-7365-w977-m58v

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: RFCOMM: free the skb when the DLC has no owner

static void rfcomm_dev_data_ready(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner;

if (!dev) { kfree_skb(skb); return; }

The socket implementation returns without freeing it, and the skb is leaked.

Free the skb, as the tty side does.