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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 09:58:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98977</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98977</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If mounts are propagated across user namespaces, attach_recursive_mnt()
locks every copy of the source mount to protect overmounts from
vanishing and revealing the underlying files or directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The user namespace is taken from the caller&amp;#39;s mount namespaces since
this is where the mounts end up. Except, that&amp;#39;s not always true.
Automounts may legitimately get popped in by tasks located in a
different mount and user namespace during path lookup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then check doesn&amp;#39;t make sense at that point. The copy in the namespace
of the parent - which may be the host&amp;#39;s - is now locked and the host
cannot change the flags of its own mounts anymore.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here&amp;#39;s the reproducer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- host has debugfs mounted nosuid,nodev,noexec and shared
- tracefs automount below it is not yet active
- hand a child process a directory descriptor on that mount
- child process enters auser and mount namespace
- child process&amp;#39; namespace now holds a locked copy of the host&amp;#39;s debugfs
  mount that receives propagation from it
- child process stats &amp;#34;tracing/.&amp;#34; through the descriptor
- lookup runs on the host&amp;#39;s mount so the automount lands below the host&amp;#39;s mount
- propagation puts a copy below the child&amp;#39;s copy
- both try to clear the flags on the mount they got, with a bind remount:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;host, on its own automount:            MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = EPERM
    child, on the copy in its namespace:   M…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If mounts are propagated across user namespaces, attach_recursive_mnt()
locks every copy of the source mount to protect overmounts from
vanishing and revealing the underlying files or directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The user namespace is taken from the caller&amp;#39;s mount namespaces since
this is where the mounts end up. Except, that&amp;#39;s not always true.
Automounts may legitimately get popped in by tasks located in a
different mount and user namespace during path lookup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then check doesn&amp;#39;t make sense at that point. The copy in the namespace
of the parent - which may be the host&amp;#39;s - is now locked and the host
cannot change the flags of its own mounts anymore.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here&amp;#39;s the reproducer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- host has debugfs mounted nosuid,nodev,noexec and shared
- tracefs automount below it is not yet active
- hand a child process a directory descriptor on that mount
- child process enters auser and mount namespace
- child process&amp;#39; namespace now holds a locked copy of the host&amp;#39;s debugfs
  mount that receives propagation from it
- child process stats &amp;#34;tracing/.&amp;#34; through the descriptor
- lookup runs on the host&amp;#39;s mount so the automount lands below the host&amp;#39;s mount
- propagation puts a copy below the child&amp;#39;s copy
- both try to clear the flags on the mount they got, with a bind remount:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;host, on its own automount:            MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = EPERM
    child, on the copy in its namespace:   M…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98977</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qrj7-g2h3-853j</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qrj7-g2h3-853j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If mounts are propagated across user namespaces, attach_recursive_mnt()
locks every copy of the source mount to protect overmounts from
vanishing and revealing the underlying files or directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The user namespace is taken from the caller&amp;#39;s mount namespaces since
this is where the mounts end up. Except, that&amp;#39;s not always true.
Automounts may legitimately get popped in by tasks located in a
different mount and user namespace during path lookup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then check doesn&amp;#39;t make sense at that point. The copy in the namespace
of the parent - which may be the host&amp;#39;s - is now locked and the host
cannot change the flags of its own mounts anymore.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here&amp;#39;s the reproducer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- host has debugfs mounted nosuid,nodev,noexec and shared
- tracefs automount below it is not yet active
- hand a child process a directory descriptor on that mount
- child process enters auser and mount namespace
- child process&amp;#39; namespace now holds a locked copy of the host&amp;#39;s debugfs
  mount that receives propagation from it
- child process stats &amp;#34;tracing/.&amp;#34; through the descriptor
- lookup runs on the host&amp;#39;s mount so the automount lands below the host&amp;#39;s mount
- propagation puts a copy below the child&amp;#39;s copy
- both try to clear the flags on the mount they got, with a bind remount:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;host, on its own automount:            MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = EPERM
    child, on the copy in its namespace:   M…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If mounts are propagated across user namespaces, attach_recursive_mnt()
locks every copy of the source mount to protect overmounts from
vanishing and revealing the underlying files or directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The user namespace is taken from the caller&amp;#39;s mount namespaces since
this is where the mounts end up. Except, that&amp;#39;s not always true.
Automounts may legitimately get popped in by tasks located in a
different mount and user namespace during path lookup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then check doesn&amp;#39;t make sense at that point. The copy in the namespace
of the parent - which may be the host&amp;#39;s - is now locked and the host
cannot change the flags of its own mounts anymore.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here&amp;#39;s the reproducer:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- host has debugfs mounted nosuid,nodev,noexec and shared
- tracefs automount below it is not yet active
- hand a child process a directory descriptor on that mount
- child process enters auser and mount namespace
- child process&amp;#39; namespace now holds a locked copy of the host&amp;#39;s debugfs
  mount that receives propagation from it
- child process stats &amp;#34;tracing/.&amp;#34; through the descriptor
- lookup runs on the host&amp;#39;s mount so the automount lands below the host&amp;#39;s mount
- propagation puts a copy below the child&amp;#39;s copy
- both try to clear the flags on the mount they got, with a bind remount:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;host, on its own automount:            MS_REMOUNT|MS_BIND = EPERM
    child, on the copy in its namespace:   M…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qrj7-g2h3-853j</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98977 — namespace: handle mount locking for automounts correctly</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98977</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98977</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98977</guid>
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