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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 23:36:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98959</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98959</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we
replace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls)
with another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully
initialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree
checker will detect at extent buffer writeback time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with
multiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same)
we delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new
one, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in
the leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size,
the new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not
initialized and we only copy the value&amp;#39;s data and set the value&amp;#39;s length
in the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name&amp;#39;s length,
the key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and
transaction ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following script reproduces the issue:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ cat test.sh
  #!/bin/bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DEV=/dev/sdi
  MNT=/mnt/sdi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
  mount $DEV $MNT&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;touch $MNT/testfile&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their
  # name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.
  setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile
  s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we
replace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls)
with another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully
initialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree
checker will detect at extent buffer writeback time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with
multiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same)
we delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new
one, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in
the leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size,
the new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not
initialized and we only copy the value&amp;#39;s data and set the value&amp;#39;s length
in the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name&amp;#39;s length,
the key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and
transaction ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following script reproduces the issue:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ cat test.sh
  #!/bin/bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DEV=/dev/sdi
  MNT=/mnt/sdi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
  mount $DEV $MNT&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;touch $MNT/testfile&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their
  # name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.
  setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile
  s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98959</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cf5f-cwf6-82gc</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cf5f-cwf6-82gc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we
replace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls)
with another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully
initialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree
checker will detect at extent buffer writeback time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with
multiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same)
we delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new
one, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in
the leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size,
the new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not
initialized and we only copy the value&amp;#39;s data and set the value&amp;#39;s length
in the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name&amp;#39;s length,
the key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and
transaction ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following script reproduces the issue:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ cat test.sh
  #!/bin/bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DEV=/dev/sdi
  MNT=/mnt/sdi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
  mount $DEV $MNT&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;touch $MNT/testfile&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their
  # name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.
  setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile
  s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we
replace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls)
with another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully
initialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree
checker will detect at extent buffer writeback time.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with
multiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same)
we delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new
one, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in
the leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size,
the new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not
initialized and we only copy the value&amp;#39;s data and set the value&amp;#39;s length
in the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name&amp;#39;s length,
the key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and
transaction ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The following script reproduces the issue:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;$ cat test.sh
  #!/bin/bash&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DEV=/dev/sdi
  MNT=/mnt/sdi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV
  mount $DEV $MNT&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;touch $MNT/testfile&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their
  # name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.
  setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile
  s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cf5f-cwf6-82gc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98959 — btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98959</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98959</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98959</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98959</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98959</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 257 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item If we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we replace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls) with another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully initialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree checker will detect at extent buffer writeback time. This is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with multiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same) we delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new one, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in the leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size, the new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not initialized and we only copy the value&amp;#39;s data and set the value&amp;#39;s length in the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name&amp;#39;s length, the key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and transaction ID. The following script reproduces the issue:   $ cat test.sh   #!/bin/bash   DEV=/dev/sdi   MNT=/mnt/sdi   mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV   mount $DEV $MNT   touch $MNT/testfile   # Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their   # name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.   setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile   setfattr -…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 257 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix xattr replace when multiple xattrs are packed in the same item If we have a btrfs_dir_item item that packs multiple xattrs and then we replace the value of one of them (with the setxattr(2) family of syscalls) with another value of a different size, we end up not having a fully initialized btrfs_dir_item, resulting in a corruption that the tree checker will detect at extent buffer writeback time. This is because in btrfs_setxattr() when we find a btrfs_dir_item with multiple xattrs (due to the crc32c hash of their name being the same) we delete one of the xattr items (btrfs_dir_item) and then insert a new one, but the deletion and insertion results in shifting existing data in the leaf and therefore when the new value of a xattr has a different size, the new btrfs_dir_item is placed in a leaf section that was not initialized and we only copy the value&amp;#39;s data and set the value&amp;#39;s length in the new btrfs_dir_item, without setting the name, the name&amp;#39;s length, the key (which must be all zeroes for xattrs), flags (BTRFS_FT_XATTR) and transaction ID. The following script reproduces the issue:   $ cat test.sh   #!/bin/bash   DEV=/dev/sdi   MNT=/mnt/sdi   mkfs.btrfs -f $DEV   mount $DEV $MNT   touch $MNT/testfile   # Add two xattrs that, on btrfs, have the same hash (crc32c) for their   # name and therefore are packed into the same btrfs_dir_item.   setfattr -n user.foobar -v 123 $MNT/testfile   setfattr -…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98959</guid>
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