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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 04:29:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1375 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1375</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98643</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98643</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A sockops prog reading skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the
tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the
ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of
the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SEC(&amp;#34;sockops&amp;#34;)
	int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
	{
		switch (skops-&amp;gt;op) {
		case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:
			leak = skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min;   /* reads the request_sock OOB */
		...
		}
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a
leaked kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks
is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is not a locked full
socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is
the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:
it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass
rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()
returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is
added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset
are no longer needed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before patch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;0: r1 = *…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A sockops prog reading skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the
tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the
ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of
the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SEC(&amp;#34;sockops&amp;#34;)
	int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
	{
		switch (skops-&amp;gt;op) {
		case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:
			leak = skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min;   /* reads the request_sock OOB */
		...
		}
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a
leaked kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks
is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is not a locked full
socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is
the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:
it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass
rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()
returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is
added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset
are no longer needed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before patch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;0: r1 = *…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98643</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xg7q-jpqp-fc7g</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xg7q-jpqp-fc7g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A sockops prog reading skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the
tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the
ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of
the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SEC(&amp;#34;sockops&amp;#34;)
	int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
	{
		switch (skops-&amp;gt;op) {
		case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:
			leak = skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min;   /* reads the request_sock OOB */
		...
		}
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a
leaked kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks
is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is not a locked full
socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is
the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:
it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass
rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()
returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is
added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset
are no longer needed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before patch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;0: r1 = *…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A sockops prog reading skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the
tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the
ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of
the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SEC(&amp;#34;sockops&amp;#34;)
	int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
	{
		switch (skops-&amp;gt;op) {
		case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:
			leak = skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min;   /* reads the request_sock OOB */
		...
		}
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a
leaked kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks
is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is not a locked full
socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is
the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:
it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass
rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()
returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is
added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset
are no longer needed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before patch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;0: r1 = *…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xg7q-jpqp-fc7g</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98643 — bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98643</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98643</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98643</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98643</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98643</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 219 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops A sockops prog reading skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory. 	SEC(&amp;#34;sockops&amp;#34;) 	int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops) 	{ 		switch (skops-&amp;gt;op) { 		case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT: 			leak = skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min;   /* reads the request_sock OOB */ 		... 		} 	} For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a leaked kernel pointer. Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is not a locked full socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is the only one open-coded, so it skips the check. Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special: it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset 	offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t) (s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get() returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset are no longer needed. Before patch: 	0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 219 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops A sockops prog reading skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory. 	SEC(&amp;#34;sockops&amp;#34;) 	int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops) 	{ 		switch (skops-&amp;gt;op) { 		case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT: 			leak = skops-&amp;gt;rtt_min;   /* reads the request_sock OOB */ 		... 		} 	} For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a leaked kernel pointer. Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops-&amp;gt;sk is not a locked full socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is the only one open-coded, so it skips the check. Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special: it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset 	offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t) (s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get() returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset are no longer needed. Before patch: 	0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98643</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4019 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4019</guid>
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