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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 17:24:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1375 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian LTS. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1375</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1375</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98550</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98550</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 48a5fe38772b (&amp;#34;tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate
GRP_ACK_MSG&amp;#34;) rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()
by returning early when less_eq(acked, m-&amp;gt;bc_acked).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, that check remains incomplete in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. When grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast
   ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already
   acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked &amp;gt; m-&amp;gt;bc_acked
   passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers.
   Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing
   tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking
   all future group broadcasts on the socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. During an active broadcast round (grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers &amp;gt; 0), the sender
   transmits packet S and advances grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers
   increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,
   so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly
   acked == grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member&amp;#39;s
   m-&amp;gt;bc_acked to prev = grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).
   This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.
   An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor
   prevented from decrementing grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 48a5fe38772b (&amp;#34;tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate
GRP_ACK_MSG&amp;#34;) rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()
by returning early when less_eq(acked, m-&amp;gt;bc_acked).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, that check remains incomplete in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. When grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast
   ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already
   acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked &amp;gt; m-&amp;gt;bc_acked
   passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers.
   Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing
   tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking
   all future group broadcasts on the socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. During an active broadcast round (grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers &amp;gt; 0), the sender
   transmits packet S and advances grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers
   increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,
   so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly
   acked == grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member&amp;#39;s
   m-&amp;gt;bc_acked to prev = grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).
   This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.
   An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor
   prevented from decrementing grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98550</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xqp5-j42w-5fq8</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xqp5-j42w-5fq8</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 48a5fe38772b (&amp;#34;tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate
GRP_ACK_MSG&amp;#34;) rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()
by returning early when less_eq(acked, m-&amp;gt;bc_acked).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, that check remains incomplete in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. When grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast
   ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already
   acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked &amp;gt; m-&amp;gt;bc_acked
   passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers.
   Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing
   tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking
   all future group broadcasts on the socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. During an active broadcast round (grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers &amp;gt; 0), the sender
   transmits packet S and advances grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers
   increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,
   so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly
   acked == grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member&amp;#39;s
   m-&amp;gt;bc_acked to prev = grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).
   This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.
   An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor
   prevented from decrementing grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 48a5fe38772b (&amp;#34;tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate
GRP_ACK_MSG&amp;#34;) rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv()
by returning early when less_eq(acked, m-&amp;gt;bc_acked).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, that check remains incomplete in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. When grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast
   ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already
   acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked &amp;gt; m-&amp;gt;bc_acked
   passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers.
   Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing
   tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking
   all future group broadcasts on the socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. During an active broadcast round (grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers &amp;gt; 0), the sender
   transmits packet S and advances grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers
   increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,
   so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly
   acked == grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member&amp;#39;s
   m-&amp;gt;bc_acked to prev = grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).
   This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.
   An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor
   prevented from decrementing grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xqp5-j42w-5fq8</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98550 — tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98550</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98550</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98550</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98550</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98550</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 240 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow Commit 48a5fe38772b (&amp;#34;tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG&amp;#34;) rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv() by returning early when less_eq(acked, m-&amp;gt;bc_acked). However, that check remains incomplete in two ways: 1. When grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast    ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already    acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked &amp;gt; m-&amp;gt;bc_acked    passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers.    Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing    tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking    all future group broadcasts on the socket. 2. During an active broadcast round (grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers &amp;gt; 0), the sender    transmits packet S and advances grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers    increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,    so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly    acked == grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt.    However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member&amp;#39;s    m-&amp;gt;bc_acked to prev = grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).    This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.    An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor    prevented from decrementing grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale    value…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-oracle, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0 and 240 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: reject invalid and unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG to prevent bc_ackers underflow Commit 48a5fe38772b (&amp;#34;tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG&amp;#34;) rejected duplicate/stale ACKs in tipc_group_proto_rcv() by returning early when less_eq(acked, m-&amp;gt;bc_acked). However, that check remains incomplete in two ways: 1. When grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers is zero (e.g. on a quiet group, when replicast    ACKs were not requested, or after all expected members have already    acknowledged), an unexpected GRP_ACK_MSG with acked &amp;gt; m-&amp;gt;bc_acked    passes less_eq() and unconditionally decrements grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers.    Because bc_ackers is a u16, this wraps to 65535, causing    tipc_group_bc_cong() to permanently report congestion and blocking    all future group broadcasts on the socket. 2. During an active broadcast round (grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers &amp;gt; 0), the sender    transmits packet S and advances grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt to S + 1. Receivers    increment their expected counter to S + 1 upon consuming packet S,    so the only valid ACK value for the current round is strictly    acked == grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt.    However, tipc_group_update_bc_members() initializes each member&amp;#39;s    m-&amp;gt;bc_acked to prev = grp-&amp;gt;bc_snd_nxt - 1 (S - 1 before increment).    This leaves a 2-sequence gap (S - 1 to S + 1) in sequence space.    An incoming ACK is therefore neither rejected as duplicate nor    prevented from decrementing grp-&amp;gt;bc_ackers if an unexpected or stale    value…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98550</guid>
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