https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 16 Oct 2026 09:47:05 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98413 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>selinux: always fill AVC decision in avc_has_perm_noaudit()</p> <p>avc_has_perm_noaudit() is documented to return a copy of the access decision in @avd, but its early return for an empty requested permission set leaves the buffer untouched. All callers pass an uninitialized stack variable and afterwards feed it to avc_audit(), and the inode hook even stores it in the per-task decision cache.</p> <p>Fill in a deny-all, audit-all decision, similar to avd_init(), so every caller receives a defined value at no cost on the hot path.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>selinux: always fill AVC decision in avc_has_perm_noaudit()</p> <p>avc_has_perm_noaudit() is documented to return a copy of the access decision in @avd, but its early return for an empty requested permission set leaves the buffer untouched. All callers pass an uninitialized stack variable and afterwards feed it to avc_audit(), and the inode hook even stores it in the per-task decision cache.</p> <p>Fill in a deny-all, audit-all decision, similar to avd_init(), so every caller receives a defined value at no cost on the hot path.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98413 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m3f9-pmfc-6c92 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>selinux: always fill AVC decision in avc_has_perm_noaudit()</p> <p>avc_has_perm_noaudit() is documented to return a copy of the access decision in @avd, but its early return for an empty requested permission set leaves the buffer untouched. All callers pass an uninitialized stack variable and afterwards feed it to avc_audit(), and the inode hook even stores it in the per-task decision cache.</p> <p>Fill in a deny-all, audit-all decision, similar to avd_init(), so every caller receives a defined value at no cost on the hot path.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>selinux: always fill AVC decision in avc_has_perm_noaudit()</p> <p>avc_has_perm_noaudit() is documented to return a copy of the access decision in @avd, but its early return for an empty requested permission set leaves the buffer untouched. All callers pass an uninitialized stack variable and afterwards feed it to avc_audit(), and the inode hook even stores it in the per-task decision cache.</p> <p>Fill in a deny-all, audit-all decision, similar to avd_init(), so every caller receives a defined value at no cost on the hot path.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m3f9-pmfc-6c92 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98413 msrc_CVE-2026-98413 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98413