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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 13:33:40 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98260</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98260</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is
attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread&amp;#39;s
posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns
that PID. pid_task(timer-&amp;gt;it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL,
but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand()
takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it
has nothing to undo.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after
exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state
normally stays invisible. But bprm-&amp;gt;point_of_no_return is set before
de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or
exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there.
exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued,
and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In short:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;the non-leader thread B           the parent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID)
  timer_settime()
    arm_timer()            // the node is queued on B
  execve()
    de_thread(B)
      exchange_tids(B, leader)  // B&amp;#39;s PID now belongs to the leader
      release_task(leader)
        __exit_signal(leader)
          posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader)  // cleans leader&amp;#39;s queue, not B&amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is
attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread&amp;#39;s
posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns
that PID. pid_task(timer-&amp;gt;it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL,
but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand()
takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it
has nothing to undo.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after
exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state
normally stays invisible. But bprm-&amp;gt;point_of_no_return is set before
de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or
exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there.
exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued,
and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In short:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;the non-leader thread B           the parent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID)
  timer_settime()
    arm_timer()            // the node is queued on B
  execve()
    de_thread(B)
      exchange_tids(B, leader)  // B&amp;#39;s PID now belongs to the leader
      release_task(leader)
        __exit_signal(leader)
          posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader)  // cleans leader&amp;#39;s queue, not B&amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98260</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pr95-77xq-3v99</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pr95-77xq-3v99</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is
attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread&amp;#39;s
posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns
that PID. pid_task(timer-&amp;gt;it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL,
but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand()
takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it
has nothing to undo.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after
exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state
normally stays invisible. But bprm-&amp;gt;point_of_no_return is set before
de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or
exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there.
exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued,
and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In short:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;the non-leader thread B           the parent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID)
  timer_settime()
    arm_timer()            // the node is queued on B
  execve()
    de_thread(B)
      exchange_tids(B, leader)  // B&amp;#39;s PID now belongs to the leader
      release_task(leader)
        __exit_signal(leader)
          posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader)  // cleans leader&amp;#39;s queue, not B&amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is
attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread&amp;#39;s
posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns
that PID. pid_task(timer-&amp;gt;it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL,
but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand()
takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it
has nothing to undo.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after
exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state
normally stays invisible. But bprm-&amp;gt;point_of_no_return is set before
de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or
exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there.
exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued,
and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In short:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;the non-leader thread B           the parent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID)
  timer_settime()
    arm_timer()            // the node is queued on B
  execve()
    de_thread(B)
      exchange_tids(B, leader)  // B&amp;#39;s PID now belongs to the leader
      release_task(leader)
        __exit_signal(leader)
          posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader)  // cleans leader&amp;#39;s queue, not B&amp;#39;…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pr95-77xq-3v99</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98260 — exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98260</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98260</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98260</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:12131-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.10-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:12131-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.10-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.10-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:12131-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:83707 — Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security, bug fix, and enhancement update</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2026:83707</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel: Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix stack buffer overflow in hci_le_big_create_sync kernel: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate LTK enc_size on load kernel: netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: fix OOB read in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table() kernel: scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show() kernel: RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path kernel: ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg kernel: ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh after handling HAO option kernel: ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo() kernel: ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() kernel: vxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() kernel: ixgbevf: fix use-after-free in VEPA multicast source pruning kernel: ALSA: virtio: Validate control metadata from the device kernel: mm/khugepaged: write all dirty file folios when collapsing kernel: AMD-SN-7061: Safe RET Interrupt Vulnerability kernel: ipv6: fix use-after-free in ip6_finish_output2() kernel: exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel: Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix stack buffer overflow in hci_le_big_create_sync kernel: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate LTK enc_size on load kernel: netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: fix OOB read in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table() kernel: scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show() kernel: RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path kernel: ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg kernel: ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh after handling HAO option kernel: ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh pointer after ipv6_hop_jumbo() kernel: ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() kernel: vxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() kernel: ixgbevf: fix use-after-free in VEPA multicast source pruning kernel: ALSA: virtio: Validate control metadata from the device kernel: mm/khugepaged: write all dirty file folios when collapsing kernel: AMD-SN-7061: Safe RET Interrupt Vulnerability kernel: ipv6: fix use-after-free in ip6_finish_output2() kernel: exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread()&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2026:83707</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98260</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98260</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 194 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread() A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread&amp;#39;s posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID. When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns that PID. pid_task(timer-&amp;gt;it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL, but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand() takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it has nothing to undo. begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state normally stays invisible. But bprm-&amp;gt;point_of_no_return is set before de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there. exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued, and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree. In short:       the non-leader thread B           the parent   timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID)   timer_settime()     arm_timer()            // the node is queued on B   execve()     de_thread(B)       exchange_tids(B, leader)  // B&amp;#39;s PID now belongs to the leader       release_task(leader)         __exit_signal(leader)           posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader)  // cleans leader&amp;#39;s queue, not B&amp;#39;s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 194 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: Cleanup POSIX timers right after de_thread() A per-thread CPU timer holds a reference to the PID of the thread it is attached to and, while it is armed, its node is queued in that thread&amp;#39;s posix_cputimers. The task is looked up by that PID. When a non-leader thread exec()s, de_thread() changes which task owns that PID. pid_task(timer-&amp;gt;it.cpu.pid, PIDTYPE_PID) then returns NULL, but the node is still queued on tsk, which is alive. timer_lock_sighand() takes a failed lookup to mean that the node is already dequeued, so it has nothing to undo. begin_new_exec() calls posix_cpu_timers_exit(me) right after exec_task_namespaces() and that removes the leftover node, so the state normally stays invisible. But bprm-&amp;gt;point_of_no_return is set before de_thread(), so if unshare_files(), set_mm_exe_file(), exec_mmap() or exec_task_namespaces() fails, the task dies before it gets there. exit_itimers() then frees the k_itimer while its node is still queued, and reaping tsk later erases that freed node from the rbtree. In short:       the non-leader thread B           the parent   timer_create(CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID)   timer_settime()     arm_timer()            // the node is queued on B   execve()     de_thread(B)       exchange_tids(B, leader)  // B&amp;#39;s PID now belongs to the leader       release_task(leader)         __exit_signal(leader)           posix_cpu_timers_exit(leader)  // cleans leader&amp;#39;s queue, not B&amp;#39;s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98260</guid>
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