<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 17:23:59 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-98167</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98167</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix server-&amp;gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In receive_encrypted_standard(), server-&amp;gt;total_read is left at the
full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted
frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size
to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly
validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation,
leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by setting server-&amp;gt;total_read to the true length of the
current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining
pdu_length for the last one.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix server-&amp;gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In receive_encrypted_standard(), server-&amp;gt;total_read is left at the
full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted
frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size
to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly
validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation,
leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by setting server-&amp;gt;total_read to the true length of the
current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining
pdu_length for the last one.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-98167</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wwfg-4wrm-v6qx</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wwfg-4wrm-v6qx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix server-&amp;gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In receive_encrypted_standard(), server-&amp;gt;total_read is left at the
full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted
frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size
to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly
validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation,
leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by setting server-&amp;gt;total_read to the true length of the
current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining
pdu_length for the last one.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix server-&amp;gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In receive_encrypted_standard(), server-&amp;gt;total_read is left at the
full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted
frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size
to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly
validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation,
leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by setting server-&amp;gt;total_read to the true length of the
current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining
pdu_length for the last one.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-wwfg-4wrm-v6qx</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-98167 — smb: client: fix server-&gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98167</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-98167</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-98167</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2026:12131-1 — kernel-devel-7.2.10-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:12131-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.10-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;kernel-devel-7.2.10-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/opensuse-su-2026:12131-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-98167</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98167</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 220 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix server-&amp;gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs In receive_encrypted_standard(), server-&amp;gt;total_read is left at the full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU. This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation, leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len(). Fix this by setting server-&amp;gt;total_read to the true length of the current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining pdu_length for the last one.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 220 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix server-&amp;gt;total_read for compound encrypted PDUs In receive_encrypted_standard(), server-&amp;gt;total_read is left at the full decrypted frame size when walking sub-PDUs of a compound encrypted frame. As a result, cifs_handle_standard() passes this full size to smb2_check_message(), causing the PDU length guards to incorrectly validate the entire compound frame instead of the current sub-PDU. This allows truncated non-last sub-PDUs to bypass length validation, leading to out-of-bounds reads in smb2_get_data_area_len(). Fix this by setting server-&amp;gt;total_read to the true length of the current sub-PDU: next_cmd for non-last sub-PDUs, and the remaining pdu_length for the last one.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-98167</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
