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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-85659</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85659</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The PilotPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.43. The vulnerability exists because the `update_cc_details()` AJAX handler forwards an attacker-supplied `username` parameter to ONTRAPORT via `api_call(&amp;#39;update_cc_details&amp;#39;, ...)` before performing the local `username_exists()` collision check, and aborts without rolling back the remote rename when a collision is detected — leaving the remote ONTRAPORT contact renamed to an existing WordPress Administrator&amp;#39;s login. On a subsequent login attempt, `user_login()` (hooked to `wp_authenticate`) authenticates against ONTRAPORT using the renamed login and the attacker&amp;#39;s own password, resolves the local WordPress user row via `get_user_by(&amp;#39;login&amp;#39;, $username)` — which now selects the real Administrator&amp;#39;s row — and calls `wp_set_password()` against that Administrator&amp;#39;s user ID; because the `user_level != 10` guard only suppresses PilotPress&amp;#39;s own cookie issuance rather than returning a `WP_Error` to core, WordPress proceeds to validate the newly-synchronized password and issues a full Administrator authentication cookie to the attacker. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above — specifically any PilotPress member holding a valid ONTRAPORT contact and the Customer Center nonce — to fully take over an Administrator account.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The PilotPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.43. The vulnerability exists because the `update_cc_details()` AJAX handler forwards an attacker-supplied `username` parameter to ONTRAPORT via `api_call(&amp;#39;update_cc_details&amp;#39;, ...)` before performing the local `username_exists()` collision check, and aborts without rolling back the remote rename when a collision is detected — leaving the remote ONTRAPORT contact renamed to an existing WordPress Administrator&amp;#39;s login. On a subsequent login attempt, `user_login()` (hooked to `wp_authenticate`) authenticates against ONTRAPORT using the renamed login and the attacker&amp;#39;s own password, resolves the local WordPress user row via `get_user_by(&amp;#39;login&amp;#39;, $username)` — which now selects the real Administrator&amp;#39;s row — and calls `wp_set_password()` against that Administrator&amp;#39;s user ID; because the `user_level != 10` guard only suppresses PilotPress&amp;#39;s own cookie issuance rather than returning a `WP_Error` to core, WordPress proceeds to validate the newly-synchronized password and issues a full Administrator authentication cookie to the attacker. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above — specifically any PilotPress member holding a valid ONTRAPORT contact and the Customer Center nonce — to fully take over an Administrator account.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-ph8g-mcqh-5p98</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-ph8g-mcqh-5p98</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The PilotPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.43. The vulnerability exists because the `update_cc_details()` AJAX handler forwards an attacker-supplied `username` parameter to ONTRAPORT via `api_call(&amp;#39;update_cc_details&amp;#39;, ...)` before performing the local `username_exists()` collision check, and aborts without rolling back the remote rename when a collision is detected — leaving the remote ONTRAPORT contact renamed to an existing WordPress Administrator&amp;#39;s login. On a subsequent login attempt, `user_login()` (hooked to `wp_authenticate`) authenticates against ONTRAPORT using the renamed login and the attacker&amp;#39;s own password, resolves the local WordPress user row via `get_user_by(&amp;#39;login&amp;#39;, $username)` — which now selects the real Administrator&amp;#39;s row — and calls `wp_set_password()` against that Administrator&amp;#39;s user ID; because the `user_level != 10` guard only suppresses PilotPress&amp;#39;s own cookie issuance rather than returning a `WP_Error` to core, WordPress proceeds to validate the newly-synchronized password and issues a full Administrator authentication cookie to the attacker. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above — specifically any PilotPress member holding a valid ONTRAPORT contact and the Customer Center nonce — to fully take over an Administrator account.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The PilotPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.43. The vulnerability exists because the `update_cc_details()` AJAX handler forwards an attacker-supplied `username` parameter to ONTRAPORT via `api_call(&amp;#39;update_cc_details&amp;#39;, ...)` before performing the local `username_exists()` collision check, and aborts without rolling back the remote rename when a collision is detected — leaving the remote ONTRAPORT contact renamed to an existing WordPress Administrator&amp;#39;s login. On a subsequent login attempt, `user_login()` (hooked to `wp_authenticate`) authenticates against ONTRAPORT using the renamed login and the attacker&amp;#39;s own password, resolves the local WordPress user row via `get_user_by(&amp;#39;login&amp;#39;, $username)` — which now selects the real Administrator&amp;#39;s row — and calls `wp_set_password()` against that Administrator&amp;#39;s user ID; because the `user_level != 10` guard only suppresses PilotPress&amp;#39;s own cookie issuance rather than returning a `WP_Error` to core, WordPress proceeds to validate the newly-synchronized password and issues a full Administrator authentication cookie to the attacker. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Subscriber-level access and above — specifically any PilotPress member holding a valid ONTRAPORT contact and the Customer Center nonce — to fully take over an Administrator account.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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