https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 19 Oct 2026 00:47:24 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84317 <p>Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, internal/config/validation.go (ValidateConfigFile) is a security control that blocks dangerous nginx directives — js_*, perl_*, load_module of the njs/perl modules, and user root. It is enforced on three of the four config-write paths: api/config/add.go, api/config/modify.go, and mcp/config/config_modify.go. The fourth path — the MCP tool nginx_config_add (mcp/config/config_add.go) — does NOT call it: it writes the caller-supplied content straight to disk and reloads nginx. An authenticated MCP caller (or an MCP agent induced via prompt injection) can therefore inject exactly the directives the control is meant to block, leading to nginx code execution on deployments where the njs/perl module is available (e.g. the official Docker image). This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.</p> <p>Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, internal/config/validation.go (ValidateConfigFile) is a security control that blocks dangerous nginx directives — js_*, perl_*, load_module of the njs/perl modules, and user root. It is enforced on three of the four config-write paths: api/config/add.go, api/config/modify.go, and mcp/config/config_modify.go. The fourth path — the MCP tool nginx_config_add (mcp/config/config_add.go) — does NOT call it: it writes the caller-supplied content straight to disk and reloads nginx. An authenticated MCP caller (or an MCP agent induced via prompt injection) can therefore inject exactly the directives the control is meant to block, leading to nginx code execution on deployments where the njs/perl module is available (e.g. the official Docker image). This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84317 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-76pm-mq2q-9gcr <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI</p> <p>## Summary `internal/config/validation.go` (`ValidateConfigFile`) is a security control that blocks dangerous nginx directives — `js_*`, `perl_*`, `load_module` of the njs/perl modules, and `user root`. It is enforced on three of the four config-write paths: `api/config/add.go`, `api/config/modify.go`, and `mcp/config/config_modify.go`. The fourth path — the MCP tool `nginx_config_add` (`mcp/config/config_add.go`) — does NOT call it: it writes the caller-supplied `content` straight to disk and reloads nginx. An authenticated MCP caller (or an MCP agent induced via prompt injection) can therefore inject exactly the directives the control is meant to block, leading to nginx code execution on deployments where the njs/perl module is available (e.g. the official Docker image).</p> <p>## Root cause — an incomplete hardening patch Commit `3e411d38` (&#34;Harden config write paths&#34;, 2026-04-21) introduced `ValidateConfigFile` and wired it into the config-write paths — but its changeset touched only: api/config/add.go (+6), api/config/modify.go (+8), internal/config/validation.go (+199), mcp/config/config_modify.go (+5) It did NOT touch `mcp/config/config_add.go`. So the MCP add path was left without the validation that all of its sibling paths received. `config_add.go` has never called `ValidateConfigFile` (verified via git history); this is an oversight in the hardening, not a regression.</p> <p>## Affected code (mcp/config/config_add.go, handleNginxConfigAdd) ```go content := mcp.GetString(a…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI</p> <p>## Summary `internal/config/validation.go` (`ValidateConfigFile`) is a security control that blocks dangerous nginx directives — `js_*`, `perl_*`, `load_module` of the njs/perl modules, and `user root`. It is enforced on three of the four config-write paths: `api/config/add.go`, `api/config/modify.go`, and `mcp/config/config_modify.go`. The fourth path — the MCP tool `nginx_config_add` (`mcp/config/config_add.go`) — does NOT call it: it writes the caller-supplied `content` straight to disk and reloads nginx. An authenticated MCP caller (or an MCP agent induced via prompt injection) can therefore inject exactly the directives the control is meant to block, leading to nginx code execution on deployments where the njs/perl module is available (e.g. the official Docker image).</p> <p>## Root cause — an incomplete hardening patch Commit `3e411d38` (&#34;Harden config write paths&#34;, 2026-04-21) introduced `ValidateConfigFile` and wired it into the config-write paths — but its changeset touched only: api/config/add.go (+6), api/config/modify.go (+8), internal/config/validation.go (+199), mcp/config/config_modify.go (+5) It did NOT touch `mcp/config/config_add.go`. So the MCP add path was left without the validation that all of its sibling paths received. `config_add.go` has never called `ValidateConfigFile` (verified via git history); this is an oversight in the hardening, not a regression.</p> <p>## Affected code (mcp/config/config_add.go, handleNginxConfigAdd) ```go content := mcp.GetString(a…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-76pm-mq2q-9gcr