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CLEANSTART-2026-FD05711 — xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module

Affected: CleanStart: n8n

Security vulnerability affects the n8n package. xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module.

fkie_cve-2026-83610

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Document.createEntityReference(name) accepts an invalid name and the ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE serializer emits the resulting nodeName directly in &name; form. Directly serializing the node or fragment with XMLSerializer.serializeToString() and requireWellFormed: true can therefore break the entity-reference boundary and produce attacker-controlled XML markup when reparsed. The parser does not ordinarily create these nodes, and element-child insertion is rejected, so exploitation requires an application to create and directly serialize an EntityReference. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.

GHSA-6gmq-8vp8-gcm6 — xmldom: XML fragment injection via invalid EntityReference.nodeName during requireWellFormed serialization

Affected: npm: @xmldom/xmldom, npm: xmldom

## Summary

An `EntityReference` node can be created with an invalid, attacker-controlled name through `Document.createEntityReference(name)`. When this node is serialized directly with:

```js serializer.serializeToString(ref, { requireWellFormed: true }) ```

the invalid `nodeName` is emitted into the serialized XML fragment without validation or escaping.

This can produce real XML markup in the serialized output. In the proof of concept below, the serialized fragment contains `<injected/>`, and reparsing the fragment creates a real `injected` element.

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## Details

The issue appears to be in the serialization path for `ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE`.

For several other node types, `requireWellFormed: true` performs specific validation checks before serialization. For example, comments, processing instructions, document types, and some character data cases are checked before being emitted.

However, for `ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE`, the serializer appears to emit the node name directly in entity reference form:

```js case ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE: buf.push('&', n.nodeName, ';'); return null; ```

As a result, if `nodeName` contains characters that break out of the intended `&name;` structure, the serializer can emit additional XML markup.

For example, an entity reference created with the name:

```text safe; <injected/> &x ```

is serialized as:

```xml &safe; <injected/> &x; ```

When this fragment is later parsed in an XML context, `<injected/>` becomes a real element.

This…

msrc_CVE-2026-83610 — xmldom: XML fragment injection via invalid EntityReference.nodeName during requireWellFormed serialization

msrc_CVE-2026-83610

UBUNTU-CVE-2026-83610

Affected: Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:26.10: node-xmldom, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-xmldom