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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-75827</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75827</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Grav before 2.0.15 contains an arbitrary file write vulnerability in the Blueprint dynamic-data bare-function validation that uses an incomplete denylist instead of a positive allowlist. Attackers with page-edit or blueprint-config access can invoke the error_log function through a data directive to append PHP payloads to web-accessible files, achieving remote code execution.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Grav before 2.0.15 contains an arbitrary file write vulnerability in the Blueprint dynamic-data bare-function validation that uses an incomplete denylist instead of a positive allowlist. Attackers with page-edit or blueprint-config access can invoke the error_log function through a data directive to append PHP payloads to web-accessible files, achieving remote code execution.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-75827</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-f8wv-xp27-6gq7 — Grav: Blueprint dynamic-data bare-function branch is denylist-gated and omits error_log, giving arbitrary file write</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-f8wv-xp27-6gq7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: getgrav/grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions and vulnerable location&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Confirmed on grav core at `78ebfc1` (tag 2.0.13).
- Sinks:
  - `system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:455-458` `call_user_func_array($o, $params)` (bare-function dynamic-data provider).
  - Twin: `system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/FlexDirectory.php:936-938` `call_user_func_array($function, $params)`.
- Validation gate: `Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall()` at `Blueprint.php:514-536`.
  - `Class::method` branch (`:514-527`) uses a strict positive allowlist `self::$allowedDynamicCallables`.
  - Bare-function branch (`:530-534`) uses only a denylist: `if (is_string($function) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; Utils::isDangerousFunction($function)) return false; return !self::paramsContainDangerousCallable($params);`.
- Denylist: `Utils::isDangerousFunction()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php`, list around `:2020-2270`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GHSA-7pgq/CVE-2026-64850 hardened the `Class::method` half of the dynamic-callable validation to a positive allowlist because a page-edit account could otherwise name any static method as a provider and reach file/secret gadgets. The bare-function half was left on a denylist (`isDangerousFunction`). Any bare PHP function not on that list executes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`error_log` is not on the denylist (verified: no occurrence in `Utils.php`). `error_log($message, 3, $destination)` appends attacker-controlled `$message` to attacker-controlled file `$destination`, an arbitrary-file-append primitive. `paramsContainDangerousCallable()` (`:587-603`) only…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: getgrav/grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions and vulnerable location&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Confirmed on grav core at `78ebfc1` (tag 2.0.13).
- Sinks:
  - `system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:455-458` `call_user_func_array($o, $params)` (bare-function dynamic-data provider).
  - Twin: `system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/FlexDirectory.php:936-938` `call_user_func_array($function, $params)`.
- Validation gate: `Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall()` at `Blueprint.php:514-536`.
  - `Class::method` branch (`:514-527`) uses a strict positive allowlist `self::$allowedDynamicCallables`.
  - Bare-function branch (`:530-534`) uses only a denylist: `if (is_string($function) &amp;amp;&amp;amp; Utils::isDangerousFunction($function)) return false; return !self::paramsContainDangerousCallable($params);`.
- Denylist: `Utils::isDangerousFunction()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php`, list around `:2020-2270`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GHSA-7pgq/CVE-2026-64850 hardened the `Class::method` half of the dynamic-callable validation to a positive allowlist because a page-edit account could otherwise name any static method as a provider and reach file/secret gadgets. The bare-function half was left on a denylist (`isDangerousFunction`). Any bare PHP function not on that list executes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`error_log` is not on the denylist (verified: no occurrence in `Utils.php`). `error_log($message, 3, $destination)` appends attacker-controlled `$message` to attacker-controlled file `$destination`, an arbitrary-file-append primitive. `paramsContainDangerousCallable()` (`:587-603`) only…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-f8wv-xp27-6gq7</guid>
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