https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 11 Oct 2026 13:44:18 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x4q3-gcj3-m6cf <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: gitea.com/gitea/runner</p> <p>### Summary act_runner appends workflow-controlled `jobs.&lt;job&gt;.container.options` directly to the Docker HostConfig for the job container. When runner privileged mode is disabled, only `Privileged` is forced false. Host namespace flags, capability expansion, and security profile overrides from workflow YAML are preserved in the final HostConfig. A workflow author can enter host PID/IPC namespaces and execute commands on the runner host as root.</p> <p>### Details Source-to-sink path in act_runner:</p> <p>- `ContainerSpec.Options` accepts workflow YAML `container.options` - `RunContext.options()` appends workflow options to runner-level container options - Job container is created with `Privileged: rc.Config.Privileged` but also with `Options: rc.options(ctx)` - `mergeContainerConfigs()` parses Docker CLI-style options into HostConfig - When privileged mode is disabled, only `copts.privileged` is forced false - `sanitizeConfig()` only filters `Binds` and `Mounts` - Preserved dangerous HostConfig fields:</p> <p>```text Privileged=false PidMode=host IpcMode=host CapAdd=[&#34;ALL&#34;] SecurityOpt=[&#34;seccomp=unconfined&#34;,&#34;apparmor=unconfined&#34;] ```</p> <p>Attacker workflow YAML: ```yaml jobs: breakout: runs-on: ubuntu-latest container: image: ubuntu:22.04 options: &gt;- --pid=host --ipc=host --cap-add=ALL --security-opt seccomp=unconfined --security-opt apparmor=unconfined steps: - name: host namespace marker run: | nsenter -t 1 -m -…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: gitea.com/gitea/runner</p> <p>### Summary act_runner appends workflow-controlled `jobs.&lt;job&gt;.container.options` directly to the Docker HostConfig for the job container. When runner privileged mode is disabled, only `Privileged` is forced false. Host namespace flags, capability expansion, and security profile overrides from workflow YAML are preserved in the final HostConfig. A workflow author can enter host PID/IPC namespaces and execute commands on the runner host as root.</p> <p>### Details Source-to-sink path in act_runner:</p> <p>- `ContainerSpec.Options` accepts workflow YAML `container.options` - `RunContext.options()` appends workflow options to runner-level container options - Job container is created with `Privileged: rc.Config.Privileged` but also with `Options: rc.options(ctx)` - `mergeContainerConfigs()` parses Docker CLI-style options into HostConfig - When privileged mode is disabled, only `copts.privileged` is forced false - `sanitizeConfig()` only filters `Binds` and `Mounts` - Preserved dangerous HostConfig fields:</p> <p>```text Privileged=false PidMode=host IpcMode=host CapAdd=[&#34;ALL&#34;] SecurityOpt=[&#34;seccomp=unconfined&#34;,&#34;apparmor=unconfined&#34;] ```</p> <p>Attacker workflow YAML: ```yaml jobs: breakout: runs-on: ubuntu-latest container: image: ubuntu:22.04 options: &gt;- --pid=host --ipc=host --cap-add=ALL --security-opt seccomp=unconfined --security-opt apparmor=unconfined steps: - name: host namespace marker run: | nsenter -t 1 -m -…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x4q3-gcj3-m6cf