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fkie_cve-2026-73560

vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.26.0, the MiMoV2OmniMultiModalProcessor in vllm/transformers_utils/processors/mimo_v2_omni.py passes attacker-controlled image and audio strings through _fetch_image, requests.get, and Image.open instead of MediaConnector, bypassing allowed_media_domains and allowed_local_media_path protections and allowing server-side requests and reads of arbitrary files accessible to the vLLM process. This issue is fixed in version 0.26.0.

GHSA-4hhp-h66f-j5j7 — vLLM: SSRF + arbitrary local file read in MiMoV2OmniMultiModalProcessor `_fetch_image` and audio loader bypass MediaCon…

Affected: PyPI: vllm

### Summary

`vllm/transformers_utils/processors/mimo_v2_omni.py` — the multimodal processor for `MiMoV2OmniForCausalLM` — issues `requests.get(...)` directly on user-supplied image and audio URL strings and `Image.open(...)` on user-supplied local paths, **without** the SSRF / `allowed_local_media_path` checks that `vllm.multimodal.utils.MediaConnector` was hardened with in **GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc**, **GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536**, and **GHSA-pf3h-qjgv-vcpr**.

This is the same bug class as those three published advisories, in a code path the patches missed. When a user passes a URL or local-file string through `multi_modal_data` (e.g. `LLM.generate(multi_modal_data={"image": "http://..."})`), the processor takes the unsanitized string and dispatches it without any URL-scheme allowlist, network-target allowlist, size cap, or local-path allowlist.

### Details

**File:** `vllm/transformers_utils/processors/mimo_v2_omni.py` (current `main`)

**Sink 1 — image SSRF + local-file read (`_fetch_image`, lines 231–249):**

```python def _fetch_image(src: Any) -> Image.Image: if isinstance(src, Image.Image): return _to_rgb(src) if isinstance(src, bytes): return _to_rgb(copy.deepcopy(Image.open(BytesIO(src)))) if isinstance(src, str): if src.startswith(("http://", "https://")): r = requests.get(src, timeout=30) # SSRF: no allowlist, follows redirects r.raise_for_status() return _to_rgb(copy.deepcopy(Image.open…

PYSEC-2026-3934 — vLLM: SSRF + arbitrary local file read in MiMoV2OmniMultiModalProcessor `_fetch_image` and audio loader bypass MediaCon…

Affected: PyPI: vllm

### Summary

### Details

**File:** `vllm/transformers_utils/processors/mimo_v2_omni.py` (current `main`)

**Sink 1 — image SSRF + local-file read (`_fetch_image`, lines 231–249):**

RHSA-2026:82059 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat AI Inference 3.5.2 (ROCm)

libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions linux-pam: Plaintext password recovery via timing discrepancy in pam_userdb module vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soundfold_sofo() vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via malicious docstrings in Python omni-completion glib: buffer over-read in glib/gvariant-serialiser.c via gvs_tuple_is_normal() glib: out-of-bounds read in glib/gdatetime.c:g_date_time_get_ymd via invalid GDateTime glib: buffer over-read in g_regex_replace() via glib/gre…