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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 05:07:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-73555</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73555</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.26.0, the validation_exception_handler in vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py converts FastAPI RequestValidationError objects with str(exc), and sanitize_message in vllm/entrypoints/utils.py does not remove traceback-style file paths, allowing unauthenticated malformed JSON requests to /v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions, /tokenize, and /detokenize to disclose the OS username, home and virtual-environment paths, Python version, internal package structure, line numbers, and endpoint handler names. This issue is fixed in version 0.26.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models. Prior to 0.26.0, the validation_exception_handler in vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py converts FastAPI RequestValidationError objects with str(exc), and sanitize_message in vllm/entrypoints/utils.py does not remove traceback-style file paths, allowing unauthenticated malformed JSON requests to /v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions, /tokenize, and /detokenize to disclose the OS username, home and virtual-environment paths, Python version, internal package structure, line numbers, and endpoint handler names. This issue is fixed in version 0.26.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-73555</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hwrm-c4cx-rf4j — vLLM: Unauthenticated Internal Path and Username Disclosure via Validation Error Messages</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-hwrm-c4cx-rf4j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic `RequestValidationError`. The `validation_exception_handler` in `vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py` converts this exception to a string via `str(exc)`, which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing `sanitize_message()` function in `vllm/entrypoints/utils.py` strips memory addresses (e.g., `0x7f...`) but does not strip `File &amp;#34;...&amp;#34;, line X` patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **OS username** running the vLLM process (e.g., `ubuntu`)
- **Home directory path** (e.g., `/home/ubuntu/`)
- **Virtual environment path** (e.g., `vllm-env/`)
- **Python version** (e.g., `3.12`)
- **Internal package structure and line numbers** (e.g., `vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py`)
- **Handler function names per endpoint**, enabling precise version fingerprinting&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the `/version` endpoint is disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/completions`, `/tokenize`, and `/detokenize`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## W…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic `RequestValidationError`. The `validation_exception_handler` in `vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py` converts this exception to a string via `str(exc)`, which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing `sanitize_message()` function in `vllm/entrypoints/utils.py` strips memory addresses (e.g., `0x7f...`) but does not strip `File &amp;#34;...&amp;#34;, line X` patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **OS username** running the vLLM process (e.g., `ubuntu`)
- **Home directory path** (e.g., `/home/ubuntu/`)
- **Virtual environment path** (e.g., `vllm-env/`)
- **Python version** (e.g., `3.12`)
- **Internal package structure and line numbers** (e.g., `vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py`)
- **Handler function names per endpoint**, enabling precise version fingerprinting&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the `/version` endpoint is disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/completions`, `/tokenize`, and `/detokenize`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## W…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-hwrm-c4cx-rf4j</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-3937 — vLLM: Unauthenticated Internal Path and Username Disclosure via Validation Error Messages</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3937</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic `RequestValidationError`. The `validation_exception_handler` in `vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py` converts this exception to a string via `str(exc)`, which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing `sanitize_message()` function in `vllm/entrypoints/utils.py` strips memory addresses (e.g., `0x7f...`) but does not strip `File &amp;#34;...&amp;#34;, line X` patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **OS username** running the vLLM process (e.g., `ubuntu`)
- **Home directory path** (e.g., `/home/ubuntu/`)
- **Virtual environment path** (e.g., `vllm-env/`)
- **Python version** (e.g., `3.12`)
- **Internal package structure and line numbers** (e.g., `vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py`)
- **Handler function names per endpoint**, enabling precise version fingerprinting&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the `/version` endpoint is disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/completions`, `/tokenize`, and `/detokenize`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## W…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: vllm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic `RequestValidationError`. The `validation_exception_handler` in `vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py` converts this exception to a string via `str(exc)`, which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing `sanitize_message()` function in `vllm/entrypoints/utils.py` strips memory addresses (e.g., `0x7f...`) but does not strip `File &amp;#34;...&amp;#34;, line X` patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **OS username** running the vLLM process (e.g., `ubuntu`)
- **Home directory path** (e.g., `/home/ubuntu/`)
- **Virtual environment path** (e.g., `vllm-env/`)
- **Python version** (e.g., `3.12`)
- **Internal package structure and line numbers** (e.g., `vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py`)
- **Handler function names per endpoint**, enabling precise version fingerprinting&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the `/version` endpoint is disabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/completions`, `/tokenize`, and `/detokenize`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## W…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3937</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:82059 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat AI Inference 3.5.2 (ROCm)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2026:82059</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions linux-pam: Plaintext password recovery via timing discrepancy in pam_userdb module vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soundfold_sofo() vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via malicious docstrings in Python omni-completion glib: buffer over-read in glib/gvariant-serialiser.c via gvs_tuple_is_normal() glib: out-of-bounds read in glib/gdatetime.c:g_date_time_get_ymd via invalid GDateTime glib: buffer over-read in g_regex_replace() via glib/gre…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions linux-pam: Plaintext password recovery via timing discrepancy in pam_userdb module vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soundfold_sofo() vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via malicious docstrings in Python omni-completion glib: buffer over-read in glib/gvariant-serialiser.c via gvs_tuple_is_normal() glib: out-of-bounds read in glib/gdatetime.c:g_date_time_get_ymd via invalid GDateTime glib: buffer over-read in g_regex_replace() via glib/gre…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/rhsa-2026:82059</guid>
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