<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 12:14:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72809</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72809</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SiYuan versions &amp;lt;= v3.7.2 (patched in v3.7.4) contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in the kernel&amp;#39;s CheckAuth function, which grants the administrator role (RoleAdministrator) to any request whose RemoteAddr is loopback (127.0.0.1) for a specific set of endpoints (including /api/system/exit, getNetwork, getWorkspaceInfo, /assets/*, and /export/*). These localhost bypasses sit outside the access auth code gate, so they apply even when an access auth code is configured. Because the fixed-port reverse proxy forwards requests to the kernel over loopback without injecting an authentication token and does not configure trusted proxies, a request forwarded through this proxy reaches the kernel with RemoteAddr = 127.0.0.1. If the fixed-port proxy is bound to a network interface, this could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to obtain admin access on the affected endpoints; however, per the advisory this remote forwarding behavior was established only by code inspection and was not reproduced end-to-end.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SiYuan versions &amp;lt;= v3.7.2 (patched in v3.7.4) contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in the kernel&amp;#39;s CheckAuth function, which grants the administrator role (RoleAdministrator) to any request whose RemoteAddr is loopback (127.0.0.1) for a specific set of endpoints (including /api/system/exit, getNetwork, getWorkspaceInfo, /assets/*, and /export/*). These localhost bypasses sit outside the access auth code gate, so they apply even when an access auth code is configured. Because the fixed-port reverse proxy forwards requests to the kernel over loopback without injecting an authentication token and does not configure trusted proxies, a request forwarded through this proxy reaches the kernel with RemoteAddr = 127.0.0.1. If the fixed-port proxy is bound to a network interface, this could allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to obtain admin access on the affected endpoints; however, per the advisory this remote forwarding behavior was established only by code inspection and was not reproduced end-to-end.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72809</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3mp7-4rh5-jrv9 — SiYuan: Localhost-trust admin bypass on auth-code-gated endpoints, with potential remote reachability via the fixed-por…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3mp7-4rh5-jrv9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72809](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72809).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The kernel&amp;#39;s `CheckAuth` grants `RoleAdministrator` to any request whose `RemoteAddr` is loopback (`127.0.0.1`), for a specific set of endpoints, and these localhost bypasses sit **outside** the `accessAuthCode` gate so they apply even when an access auth code is configured. This is demonstrated live (Part A below).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Separately, the fixed-port reverse proxy (`fixedport.go`) forwards requests to the kernel over loopback and injects no authentication token, and no `SetTrustedProxies` is configured, so gin does not derive the client address from forwarding headers. By code inspection, a request forwarded through this proxy would reach the kernel with `RemoteAddr = 127.0.0.1`. **If** the fixed-port proxy is bound to a network interface (via `NetworkServe`) and forwards remote requests to the kernel this way, the localhost bypass would grant a remote unauthenticated caller admin on those endpoints. This second step is established by reading the code but was **not reproduced end-to-end**, and I&amp;#39;m asking the maintainer to confirm the proxy&amp;#39;s runtime forwarding behavior (Part B below).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Localhost-trust admin bypass (proven).** `CheckAuth` (`session.go:298-321`) contains localhost-only bypasses that key off `RemoteAddr` and grant `RoleAdministrator`. They sit outside the `accessAuthCode` gate i.e. they apply even when an access auth code is set an…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72809](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72809).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The kernel&amp;#39;s `CheckAuth` grants `RoleAdministrator` to any request whose `RemoteAddr` is loopback (`127.0.0.1`), for a specific set of endpoints, and these localhost bypasses sit **outside** the `accessAuthCode` gate so they apply even when an access auth code is configured. This is demonstrated live (Part A below).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Separately, the fixed-port reverse proxy (`fixedport.go`) forwards requests to the kernel over loopback and injects no authentication token, and no `SetTrustedProxies` is configured, so gin does not derive the client address from forwarding headers. By code inspection, a request forwarded through this proxy would reach the kernel with `RemoteAddr = 127.0.0.1`. **If** the fixed-port proxy is bound to a network interface (via `NetworkServe`) and forwards remote requests to the kernel this way, the localhost bypass would grant a remote unauthenticated caller admin on those endpoints. This second step is established by reading the code but was **not reproduced end-to-end**, and I&amp;#39;m asking the maintainer to confirm the proxy&amp;#39;s runtime forwarding behavior (Part B below).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Localhost-trust admin bypass (proven).** `CheckAuth` (`session.go:298-321`) contains localhost-only bypasses that key off `RemoteAddr` and grant `RoleAdministrator`. They sit outside the `accessAuthCode` gate i.e. they apply even when an access auth code is set an…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-3mp7-4rh5-jrv9</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
