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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-72801</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72801</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 disclose encrypted-notebook key-derivation material and wrapped data keys through unauthenticated endpoints in publish mode. Attackers can retrieve Argon2id salt, cost parameters, password verifiers, and wrapped notebook keys to perform unlimited offline master-password cracking without rate limiting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 disclose encrypted-notebook key-derivation material and wrapped data keys through unauthenticated endpoints in publish mode. Attackers can retrieve Argon2id salt, cost parameters, password verifiers, and wrapped notebook keys to perform unlimited offline master-password cracking without rate limiting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-72801</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-8x84-r2ff-h8pq — SiYuan: Encrypted-notebook key-derivation material and wrapped notebook keys disclosed to anonymous readers, enabling o…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8x84-r2ff-h8pq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72801](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72801).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two `CheckAuth`-only endpoints disclose the complete offline attack material for the encrypted-notebook master password, plus the wrapped per-notebook key needed to use it. Both are reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. An unauthenticated remote client can retrieve the Argon2id salt and cost parameters, a verifier that confirms a correct password offline, and the encrypted per-notebook data key reducing the security of every encrypted notebook to the master password&amp;#39;s resistance to offline GPU cracking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**(1) `POST /api/system/getConf` leaks `NotebookCrypto`.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`getConf` → `GetMaskedConf()` marshals the full configuration including `NotebookCrypto *conf.NotebookCrypto` (JSON tag `notebookCrypto`, not `-`, so it survives the deep copy). For non-administrators `HideConfSecret()` is applied, which nulls a dozen secret-bearing fields like AI, MCPOAuth, Api, Flashcard, Publish, Repo, Sync, Secrets, Variables, System paths but contains **no reference to `NotebookCrypto`**. `FilterConfByPublishIgnore()` for readers only touches `UILayout`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reader therefore receives:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | What it is |
|---|---|
| `MasterSalt` | global Argon2id salt |
| `KDFParams` | Argon2id memory/time/parallelism cost |
| `KEKVerifier` + `VerifierNonce` | AES-GCM-encrypted fixed magic, the in-c…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72801](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72801).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two `CheckAuth`-only endpoints disclose the complete offline attack material for the encrypted-notebook master password, plus the wrapped per-notebook key needed to use it. Both are reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. An unauthenticated remote client can retrieve the Argon2id salt and cost parameters, a verifier that confirms a correct password offline, and the encrypted per-notebook data key reducing the security of every encrypted notebook to the master password&amp;#39;s resistance to offline GPU cracking.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**(1) `POST /api/system/getConf` leaks `NotebookCrypto`.**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`getConf` → `GetMaskedConf()` marshals the full configuration including `NotebookCrypto *conf.NotebookCrypto` (JSON tag `notebookCrypto`, not `-`, so it survives the deep copy). For non-administrators `HideConfSecret()` is applied, which nulls a dozen secret-bearing fields like AI, MCPOAuth, Api, Flashcard, Publish, Repo, Sync, Secrets, Variables, System paths but contains **no reference to `NotebookCrypto`**. `FilterConfByPublishIgnore()` for readers only touches `UILayout`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reader therefore receives:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Field | What it is |
|---|---|
| `MasterSalt` | global Argon2id salt |
| `KDFParams` | Argon2id memory/time/parallelism cost |
| `KEKVerifier` + `VerifierNonce` | AES-GCM-encrypted fixed magic, the in-c…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8x84-r2ff-h8pq</guid>
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