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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-70557</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-70557</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;diboot-core&amp;#39;s POST /common/load-related-data endpoint resolves caller-supplied field names to any @TableField column of any entity and returns those values for all rows, with no field or entity allowlist. The only guard, relatedDataSecurityCheck(), returns true unconditionally, so any authenticated user (including a zero-role account) can read @JsonIgnore-annotated secret fields such as IamAccount.authSecret and IamAccount.secretSalt for every account, or arbitrary secret fields of any other entity. Shiro&amp;#39;s two-iteration MD5 with an 8-character salt is trivially crackable offline, so the disclosed admin password hashes convert to full administrative takeover. The endpoint is not example code; the official diboot-admin-ui frontend requires it, so deployments following the vendor&amp;#39;s recommended integration expose it. The mechanism was renamed relatedData* to attachMore* on the development branch, but attachMoreSecurityCheck() also returns true unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;diboot-core&amp;#39;s POST /common/load-related-data endpoint resolves caller-supplied field names to any @TableField column of any entity and returns those values for all rows, with no field or entity allowlist. The only guard, relatedDataSecurityCheck(), returns true unconditionally, so any authenticated user (including a zero-role account) can read @JsonIgnore-annotated secret fields such as IamAccount.authSecret and IamAccount.secretSalt for every account, or arbitrary secret fields of any other entity. Shiro&amp;#39;s two-iteration MD5 with an 8-character salt is trivially crackable offline, so the disclosed admin password hashes convert to full administrative takeover. The endpoint is not example code; the official diboot-admin-ui frontend requires it, so deployments following the vendor&amp;#39;s recommended integration expose it. The mechanism was renamed relatedData* to attachMore* on the development branch, but attachMoreSecurityCheck() also returns true unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-5cj8-jrqq-crmv</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5cj8-jrqq-crmv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;diboot-core&amp;#39;s POST /common/load-related-data endpoint resolves caller-supplied field names to any @TableField column of any entity and returns those values for all rows, with no field or entity allowlist. The only guard, relatedDataSecurityCheck(), returns true unconditionally, so any authenticated user (including a zero-role account) can read @JsonIgnore-annotated secret fields such as IamAccount.authSecret and IamAccount.secretSalt for every account, or arbitrary secret fields of any other entity. Shiro&amp;#39;s two-iteration MD5 with an 8-character salt is trivially crackable offline, so the disclosed admin password hashes convert to full administrative takeover. The endpoint is not example code; the official diboot-admin-ui frontend requires it, so deployments following the vendor&amp;#39;s recommended integration expose it. The mechanism was renamed relatedData* to attachMore* on the development branch, but attachMoreSecurityCheck() also returns true unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;diboot-core&amp;#39;s POST /common/load-related-data endpoint resolves caller-supplied field names to any @TableField column of any entity and returns those values for all rows, with no field or entity allowlist. The only guard, relatedDataSecurityCheck(), returns true unconditionally, so any authenticated user (including a zero-role account) can read @JsonIgnore-annotated secret fields such as IamAccount.authSecret and IamAccount.secretSalt for every account, or arbitrary secret fields of any other entity. Shiro&amp;#39;s two-iteration MD5 with an 8-character salt is trivially crackable offline, so the disclosed admin password hashes convert to full administrative takeover. The endpoint is not example code; the official diboot-admin-ui frontend requires it, so deployments following the vendor&amp;#39;s recommended integration expose it. The mechanism was renamed relatedData* to attachMore* on the development branch, but attachMoreSecurityCheck() also returns true unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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