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fkie_cve-2026-63445

Perses is an open-source dashboard and visualization project for observability data. Prior to 0.54.0-rc.0, list endpoints used with the file-system database bind the request-controlled project query parameter into the resource Query structure without validating it against directory traversal characters, and the resulting project value is used to select database paths. An authenticated attacker can supply directory traversal segments to leave the intended project directory, read arbitrary YAML or JSON files accessible to the Perses process, and bypass project isolation to enumerate other file-backed resources. This issue is fixed in version 0.54.0-rc.0.

GHSA-vr5f-w35q-98jp — Perses's unvalidated project parameter enables filesystem path traversal

Affected: Go: github.com/perses/perses

### Impact When Perses is using the file system database, on the list endpoints, the project value is bound from the request into the resource `Query` struct and is never validated against directory-traversal characters (validation/Flatten only runs for Create/Update bodies, not list queries).

The path is then used to retrieve files in the database directly.

Attacker can read arbitrary YAML/JSON files from the server host and can bypass the security constraints to get access to other resources contained in the file database.

For example `https://localhost:8080/api/v1/dashboards?project=../projects` returns the list of the project while it must not return anything.

### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_

### Workarounds Avoid using the file system database in production. Use SQL database instead.

openSUSE-SU-2026:11413-1 — perses-cli-0.54.0-1.1 on GA media

perses-cli-0.54.0-1.1 on GA media