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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-63116</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63116</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;deepstream is a server that allows clients and backend services to sync data, send messages and make rpcs at scale. From 10.1.0 until 10.1.1, src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts omits RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI from RULES_MAP. When an authenticated user sends a PATCH_MULTI record operation while permission.type is config, getRulesForMessage returns a null rule specification and ConfigPermission.canPerformAction treats the missing specification as an unconditional allow instead of applying RULE_TYPES.WRITE. Any authenticated user can therefore modify arbitrary protected records, corrupt application state, or cause service disruption; deployments using the default permission type none already allow all operations and are not additionally affected. This issue is fixed in version 10.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;deepstream is a server that allows clients and backend services to sync data, send messages and make rpcs at scale. From 10.1.0 until 10.1.1, src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts omits RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI from RULES_MAP. When an authenticated user sends a PATCH_MULTI record operation while permission.type is config, getRulesForMessage returns a null rule specification and ConfigPermission.canPerformAction treats the missing specification as an unconditional allow instead of applying RULE_TYPES.WRITE. Any authenticated user can therefore modify arbitrary protected records, corrupt application state, or cause service disruption; deployments using the default permission type none already allow all operations and are not additionally affected. This issue is fixed in version 10.1.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63116</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-89vx-jh4q-vg3w — deepstream: PATCH_MULTI action bypasses Valve permission system allowing unauthorized record writes</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-89vx-jh4q-vg3w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @deepstream/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` action is not registered in the Valve permission system&amp;#39;s `RULES_MAP` (`src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts`). When `ConfigPermission.canPerformAction()` is called for a PATCH_MULTI message, `getRulesForMessage()` returns `null` because the action is missing from the map. This triggers an unconditional allow (`callback(..., null, true)`), completely bypassing all configured Valve permission rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any authenticated user — regardless of their configured permissions — can write arbitrary data to any record using the PATCH_MULTI action.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts` lines 38-54, the `RULES_MAP[TOPIC.RECORD].actions` dictionary maps record actions to permission rule types. The actions registered include: SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBEANDHEAD, SUBSCRIBEANDREAD, READ, HEAD, LISTEN, CREATE, UPDATE, PATCH, NOTIFY, DELETE, ERASE. However, `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` is **absent** from this map.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `getRulesForMessage()` at line 86-99 encounters an action not in the map, it returns `null`. In `config-permission.ts` at line 88-93, when `ruleSpecification === null`, the callback is invoked with `true` (allow) unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attack Chain&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker authenticates with any valid credentials (even a minimal-privilege user)
2. Attacker sends a WebSocket message: `{topic: RECORD, action: PATCH_MULTI, name: &amp;#34;admin/secret-record&amp;#34;, parsedData: [{path: &amp;#34;role&amp;#34;, data: &amp;#34;admin&amp;#34;}]}`
3. `message-processor.ts:68` invo…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @deepstream/server&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` action is not registered in the Valve permission system&amp;#39;s `RULES_MAP` (`src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts`). When `ConfigPermission.canPerformAction()` is called for a PATCH_MULTI message, `getRulesForMessage()` returns `null` because the action is missing from the map. This triggers an unconditional allow (`callback(..., null, true)`), completely bypassing all configured Valve permission rules.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any authenticated user — regardless of their configured permissions — can write arbitrary data to any record using the PATCH_MULTI action.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts` lines 38-54, the `RULES_MAP[TOPIC.RECORD].actions` dictionary maps record actions to permission rule types. The actions registered include: SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBEANDHEAD, SUBSCRIBEANDREAD, READ, HEAD, LISTEN, CREATE, UPDATE, PATCH, NOTIFY, DELETE, ERASE. However, `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` is **absent** from this map.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `getRulesForMessage()` at line 86-99 encounters an action not in the map, it returns `null`. In `config-permission.ts` at line 88-93, when `ruleSpecification === null`, the callback is invoked with `true` (allow) unconditionally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Attack Chain&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Attacker authenticates with any valid credentials (even a minimal-privilege user)
2. Attacker sends a WebSocket message: `{topic: RECORD, action: PATCH_MULTI, name: &amp;#34;admin/secret-record&amp;#34;, parsedData: [{path: &amp;#34;role&amp;#34;, data: &amp;#34;admin&amp;#34;}]}`
3. `message-processor.ts:68` invo…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-89vx-jh4q-vg3w</guid>
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