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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-62672</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62672</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.4, Grav allowlists the regex_replace filter and function in system/config/security.yaml, and GravExtension::regexReplace() passes an editor-controlled pattern directly to preg_replace(). When security.twig_content.process_enabled is enabled, an authenticated page editor can publish a catastrophically backtracking pattern that consumes PHP worker CPU and denies service to site visitors. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.4, Grav allowlists the regex_replace filter and function in system/config/security.yaml, and GravExtension::regexReplace() passes an editor-controlled pattern directly to preg_replace(). When security.twig_content.process_enabled is enabled, an authenticated page editor can publish a catastrophically backtracking pattern that consumes PHP worker CPU and denies service to site visitors. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62672</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-37f3-6p89-6qr9 — Grav: Authenticated ReDoS via regex_replace in Twig Sandbox</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-37f3-6p89-6qr9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: getgrav/grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `regex_replace` filter and function are allowlisted in Grav&amp;#39;s Twig content sandbox. When Twig processing in page content is enabled `security.twig_content.process_enabled: true`, authenticated page editors can supply a catastrophically backtracking PCRE pattern, causing unbounded CPU consumption and denying service to the entire web server process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Twig sandbox allowlists, defined in `system/config/security.yaml`, explicitly include `regex_replace` in both the filter and function permission lists:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Source: `system/config/security.yaml`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```yaml
twig_sandbox:
  allowed_filters:
    # ...
    - regex_replace    #  user-controlled pattern allowed in sandbox
  allowed_functions:
    # ...
    - regex_replace    #  same
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The underlying implementation passes the caller-controlled `$pattern` directly into PHP&amp;#39;s `preg_replace()` without any pattern complexity validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Source: `system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Extension/GravExtension.php:1317-1319`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function regexReplace($subject, $pattern, $replace, $limit = -1)
{
    return preg_replace($pattern, $replace, $subject, $limit);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `twig_content.process_enabled` is `true`, page body content is sandboxed but can use any allowlisted filter. An editor who embeds a catastrophic backtracking pattern causes the PCRE engine to enter exponential time complexity, consuming 100% CPU until the PHP process is killed or the request times out.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Conditions required**:
1. `sec…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: getgrav/grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `regex_replace` filter and function are allowlisted in Grav&amp;#39;s Twig content sandbox. When Twig processing in page content is enabled `security.twig_content.process_enabled: true`, authenticated page editors can supply a catastrophically backtracking PCRE pattern, causing unbounded CPU consumption and denying service to the entire web server process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;---&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Twig sandbox allowlists, defined in `system/config/security.yaml`, explicitly include `regex_replace` in both the filter and function permission lists:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Source: `system/config/security.yaml`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```yaml
twig_sandbox:
  allowed_filters:
    # ...
    - regex_replace    #  user-controlled pattern allowed in sandbox
  allowed_functions:
    # ...
    - regex_replace    #  same
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The underlying implementation passes the caller-controlled `$pattern` directly into PHP&amp;#39;s `preg_replace()` without any pattern complexity validation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Source: `system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Extension/GravExtension.php:1317-1319`**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```php
public function regexReplace($subject, $pattern, $replace, $limit = -1)
{
    return preg_replace($pattern, $replace, $subject, $limit);
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When `twig_content.process_enabled` is `true`, page body content is sandboxed but can use any allowlisted filter. An editor who embeds a catastrophic backtracking pattern causes the PCRE engine to enter exponential time complexity, consuming 100% CPU until the PHP process is killed or the request times out.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Conditions required**:
1. `sec…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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