https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 02 Oct 2026 02:58:49 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55663 <p>mediasoup is a WebRTC video conferencing system. From version 3.20.0 until 3.20.6 for the npm package and from 0.22.0 until 0.22.5 for the Rust crate, mediasoup&#39;s built-in SCTP stack authenticates state cookies using only the hardcoded msworker and 0xAD81 magic values instead of a per-instance secret and HMAC, contrary to RFC 9260 Section 5.1.3. The cookie structure and validation in worker/include/RTC/SCTP/association/StateCookie.hpp and worker/src/RTC/SCTP/association/StateCookie.cpp allow an on-path attacker targeting PlainTransport or PipeTransport with SCTP enabled and without DTLS protection to forge a COOKIE-ECHO whose packet verification tag matches the attacker-controlled localVerificationTag. The forged cookie passes StateCookie::IsMediasoupStateCookie() and Association::HandleReceivedCookieEchoChunk(), establishes an unauthorized SCTP association, and permits DataChannel message injection as a trusted peer. WebRtcTransport is not affected because its SCTP runs inside DTLS. This issue is fixed in npm version 3.20.6 and Rust crate version 0.22.5.</p> <p>mediasoup is a WebRTC video conferencing system. From version 3.20.0 until 3.20.6 for the npm package and from 0.22.0 until 0.22.5 for the Rust crate, mediasoup&#39;s built-in SCTP stack authenticates state cookies using only the hardcoded msworker and 0xAD81 magic values instead of a per-instance secret and HMAC, contrary to RFC 9260 Section 5.1.3. The cookie structure and validation in worker/include/RTC/SCTP/association/StateCookie.hpp and worker/src/RTC/SCTP/association/StateCookie.cpp allow an on-path attacker targeting PlainTransport or PipeTransport with SCTP enabled and without DTLS protection to forge a COOKIE-ECHO whose packet verification tag matches the attacker-controlled localVerificationTag. The forged cookie passes StateCookie::IsMediasoupStateCookie() and Association::HandleReceivedCookieEchoChunk(), establishes an unauthorized SCTP association, and permits DataChannel message injection as a trusted peer. WebRtcTransport is not affected because its SCTP runs inside DTLS. This issue is fixed in npm version 3.20.6 and Rust crate version 0.22.5.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-55663 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-p7x2-g5cq-fhmq <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: mediasoup, crates.io: mediasoup</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>mediasoup&#39;s built-in SCTP stack (introduced in v3.20.0) authenticates SCTP state cookies using only hardcoded magic byte sequences rather than a per-instance HMAC keyed with a secret, violating RFC 9260 Section 5.1.3. An on-path attacker targeting a PlainTransport with SCTP enabled (and no SRTP/DTLS protection) can craft a forged COOKIE-ECHO chunk that passes all validation, establishing an unauthorized SCTP association and gaining the ability to inject DataChannel messages as a trusted peer.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>RFC 9260 Section 5.1.3 states: &#34;An endpoint MUST use a one-time-use secret key to protect the State Cookie.&#34; The mediasoup implementation ignores this requirement. The state cookie is defined in `worker/include/RTC/SCTP/association/StateCookie.hpp` with the following structure (44 bytes total):</p> <p>- Offset 0: Magic1 = `&#34;msworker&#34;` (hardcoded, 8 bytes) - Offset 8: localVerificationTag (4 bytes, attacker-controlled) - Offset 12: remoteVerificationTag (4 bytes, attacker-controlled) - Offset 16-27: TSN and window fields (attacker-controlled) - Offset 28: tieTag (8 bytes, attacker-controlled) - Offset 36: NegotiatedCapabilitiesField containing Magic2 = `0xAD81` (hardcoded)</p> <p>The validation function `StateCookie::IsMediasoupStateCookie()` in `worker/src/RTC/SCTP/association/StateCookie.cpp` only checks: 1. `bufferLength == 44` 2. `bytes[0:8] == &#34;msworker&#34;` (Magic1, always the same) 3. `ntohs(bytes[38:40]) == 0xAD81` (Magic2, always the same)</p> <p>No HMAC, no per-session se…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: mediasoup, crates.io: mediasoup</p> <p>### Summary</p> <p>mediasoup&#39;s built-in SCTP stack (introduced in v3.20.0) authenticates SCTP state cookies using only hardcoded magic byte sequences rather than a per-instance HMAC keyed with a secret, violating RFC 9260 Section 5.1.3. An on-path attacker targeting a PlainTransport with SCTP enabled (and no SRTP/DTLS protection) can craft a forged COOKIE-ECHO chunk that passes all validation, establishing an unauthorized SCTP association and gaining the ability to inject DataChannel messages as a trusted peer.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>RFC 9260 Section 5.1.3 states: &#34;An endpoint MUST use a one-time-use secret key to protect the State Cookie.&#34; The mediasoup implementation ignores this requirement. The state cookie is defined in `worker/include/RTC/SCTP/association/StateCookie.hpp` with the following structure (44 bytes total):</p> <p>- Offset 0: Magic1 = `&#34;msworker&#34;` (hardcoded, 8 bytes) - Offset 8: localVerificationTag (4 bytes, attacker-controlled) - Offset 12: remoteVerificationTag (4 bytes, attacker-controlled) - Offset 16-27: TSN and window fields (attacker-controlled) - Offset 28: tieTag (8 bytes, attacker-controlled) - Offset 36: NegotiatedCapabilitiesField containing Magic2 = `0xAD81` (hardcoded)</p> <p>The validation function `StateCookie::IsMediasoupStateCookie()` in `worker/src/RTC/SCTP/association/StateCookie.cpp` only checks: 1. `bufferLength == 44` 2. `bytes[0:8] == &#34;msworker&#34;` (Magic1, always the same) 3. `ntohs(bytes[38:40]) == 0xAD81` (Magic2, always the same)</p> <p>No HMAC, no per-session se…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-p7x2-g5cq-fhmq