fkie_cve-2026-54162

Ember is a real-time terminal dashboard for Caddy servers with FrankenPHP support. Prior to 1.4.2, interactive TUI row formatters pass Caddy access-log fields, particularly the request URI, through the `fitCellLeft` render helper without neutralizing terminal escape or control sequences. An unauthenticated remote client can place ANSI, OSC, or CSI control bytes in an ordinary HTTP request target. Caddy JSON-escapes those bytes, `ParseLogLine` decodes them back into raw controls, and the formatters concatenate them into `View()` output reaching `os.Stdout`. When the operator views the default `Logs` tab, the terminal interprets these sequences, allowing monitoring-dashboard spoofing, clipboard hijacking through `OSC 52`, and window-title spoofing through `OSC 0/2`. This works even with a loopback-only log listener because the input arrives through normal Caddy access logs. `Certificates` and `Routes` share secondary unneutralized render sinks. The `--json`, `--once`, and daemon `--expose` modes are unaffected because they do not render an interactive terminal. Consequences depend on the terminal emulator and usually require further operator action to escalate; this is not general-purpose remote code execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.2.

GHSA-x3g7-qrwc-f6c5 — Ember has unneutralized terminal escape/control sequences from Caddy logs injected into the operator's TUI

Affected: Go: github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember

## Summary

Ember's interactive TUI renders fields taken from the monitored Caddy server's access logs — most notably the request URI — straight to the operator's terminal without neutralising terminal escape or control sequences (CWE-150). Those log fields are populated from arbitrary, unauthenticated HTTP requests, so any remote client can embed ANSI/OSC/CSI control bytes that the operator's terminal emulator interprets when the log row is displayed. The bytes survive the whole pipeline: Caddy escapes them into its JSON access log as unicode escapes, ember's `ParseLogLine` decodes them back to raw `0x1b`/`0x07` bytes, and the row formatters concatenate them into the bubbletea `View()` output with no encoding before they reach `os.Stdout`.

## Impact

An **unauthenticated, remote** attacker who can send HTTP requests to the Caddy server that ember monitors can inject terminal escape sequences into the operator's TUI. The trigger is a single ordinary HTTP request with control bytes in the request target. It requires no authentication; because the payload is reflected through Caddy's normal access log, it works even when ember's log listener is bound only to loopback. When the operator views the Logs tab — ember's default, zero-config mode — the terminal emulator interprets the injected sequences. Broadly-supported, demonstrated impact includes:

- **Monitoring-dashboard spoofing** — CSI cursor/erase/scroll sequences forge or hide log rows so the operator misjudges the monito…

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fkie_cve-2026-54162

GHSA-x3g7-qrwc-f6c5 — Ember has unneutralized terminal escape/control sequences from Caddy logs injected into the operator's TUI