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      <title>GHSA-fp5j-4fj2-4jvq — Radius Controller May Delete a Container Resource via an Injected Deployment Annotation (Multi-Tenant Installs)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-fp5j-4fj2-4jvq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/radius-project/radius&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Radius Controller May Delete a Container Resource via an Injected Deployment Annotation (Multi-Tenant Installs)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A configuration-validation issue in the Radius Kubernetes controller can cause it to issue a `DELETE` for the container resource referenced by a tampered `radapp.io/status` annotation on a Deployment. It follows the &amp;#34;Confused Deputy&amp;#34; pattern. Real-world impact is bounded and depends heavily on install topology: in a multi-tenant install (one controller reconciling Deployments across resource groups owned by different teams) it can affect another team&amp;#39;s container, while in a single-tenant install it is only self-DoS. There is no data disclosure, no privilege escalation, and no persistence, and deleted resources are recoverable through standard Radius deployment workflows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Vulnerability Type**: Configuration Injection / Cross-Tenant Resource Deletion
- **CVSS 3.1 Score**: 7.7 (High in worst-case multi-tenant installs; Medium or lower in single-tenant or strict-RBAC installs)
- **CWE Classification**: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), CWE-441 (Unintended Proxy or Intermediary)
- **Affected Versions**: Radius v0.57.1 and earlier versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Radius controller deserializes user-controllable JSON data from the `radapp.io/status` annotation on Kubernetes Deployments without validating whether the resource IDs belong to the current tenant. When the controller performs delete operations, it uses its own high-p…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/radius-project/radius&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;# Radius Controller May Delete a Container Resource via an Injected Deployment Annotation (Multi-Tenant Installs)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A configuration-validation issue in the Radius Kubernetes controller can cause it to issue a `DELETE` for the container resource referenced by a tampered `radapp.io/status` annotation on a Deployment. It follows the &amp;#34;Confused Deputy&amp;#34; pattern. Real-world impact is bounded and depends heavily on install topology: in a multi-tenant install (one controller reconciling Deployments across resource groups owned by different teams) it can affect another team&amp;#39;s container, while in a single-tenant install it is only self-DoS. There is no data disclosure, no privilege escalation, and no persistence, and deleted resources are recoverable through standard Radius deployment workflows.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **Vulnerability Type**: Configuration Injection / Cross-Tenant Resource Deletion
- **CVSS 3.1 Score**: 7.7 (High in worst-case multi-tenant installs; Medium or lower in single-tenant or strict-RBAC installs)
- **CWE Classification**: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), CWE-441 (Unintended Proxy or Intermediary)
- **Affected Versions**: Radius v0.57.1 and earlier versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Radius controller deserializes user-controllable JSON data from the `radapp.io/status` annotation on Kubernetes Deployments without validating whether the resource IDs belong to the current tenant. When the controller performs delete operations, it uses its own high-p…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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