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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 20:49:23 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-53920</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-53920</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;odhcpd is the DHCPv6, DHCPv4, and router-advertisement server used by OpenWrt. From version 17.01.0 to before version 25.12.3, odhcpd&amp;#39;s DHCPv6 IA parser accepts an IA_NA or IA_PD option whose body is shorter than struct dhcpv6_ia_hdr, casts the option header to that full structure, and reads ia-&amp;gt;iaid before proving that the IA body contains the IAID field. If an unauthenticated network-adjacent client places a zero-length or otherwise short IA option at the end of odhcpd&amp;#39;s 8192-byte receive stack buffer, the IAID read crosses from data_buf into adjacent stack memory. The disclosed bytes are then reflected in the DHCPv6 reply IAID; prior ARM validation showed data_buf[8192:8196] disclosing the saved stack canary, and wider stack scans can leak ASLR-useful stack/process contents. This issue has been patched in version 25.12.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;odhcpd is the DHCPv6, DHCPv4, and router-advertisement server used by OpenWrt. From version 17.01.0 to before version 25.12.3, odhcpd&amp;#39;s DHCPv6 IA parser accepts an IA_NA or IA_PD option whose body is shorter than struct dhcpv6_ia_hdr, casts the option header to that full structure, and reads ia-&amp;gt;iaid before proving that the IA body contains the IAID field. If an unauthenticated network-adjacent client places a zero-length or otherwise short IA option at the end of odhcpd&amp;#39;s 8192-byte receive stack buffer, the IAID read crosses from data_buf into adjacent stack memory. The disclosed bytes are then reflected in the DHCPv6 reply IAID; prior ARM validation showed data_buf[8192:8196] disclosing the saved stack canary, and wider stack scans can leak ASLR-useful stack/process contents. This issue has been patched in version 25.12.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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