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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-48688</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48688</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains multiple out-of-bounds reads in the BGP MP_REACH_NLRI IPv6 attribute decoder. The function decode_mp_reach_ipv6() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp contains a TODO comment at line 156 explicitly acknowledging &amp;#39;we should add sanity checks to avoid reads after attribute memory block.&amp;#39; The function casts raw pointers to structure types without verifying sufficient data exists (line 158), uses the attacker-controlled length_of_next_hop field to determine memcpy size (line 181), and computes prefix_length by dereferencing a pointer calculated from multiple attacker-controlled offsets without bounds validation (line 189). The prefix_length is then used to calculate number_of_bytes_required_for_prefix which becomes a memcpy length (line 202) with no check against remaining buffer size.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains multiple out-of-bounds reads in the BGP MP_REACH_NLRI IPv6 attribute decoder. The function decode_mp_reach_ipv6() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp contains a TODO comment at line 156 explicitly acknowledging &amp;#39;we should add sanity checks to avoid reads after attribute memory block.&amp;#39; The function casts raw pointers to structure types without verifying sufficient data exists (line 158), uses the attacker-controlled length_of_next_hop field to determine memcpy size (line 181), and computes prefix_length by dereferencing a pointer calculated from multiple attacker-controlled offsets without bounds validation (line 189). The prefix_length is then used to calculate number_of_bytes_required_for_prefix which becomes a memcpy length (line 202) with no check against remaining buffer size.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-48688</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rxgw-72v4-4rvj</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rxgw-72v4-4rvj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains multiple out-of-bounds reads in the BGP MP_REACH_NLRI IPv6 attribute decoder. The function decode_mp_reach_ipv6() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp contains a TODO comment at line 156 explicitly acknowledging &amp;#39;we should add sanity checks to avoid reads after attribute memory block.&amp;#39; The function casts raw pointers to structure types without verifying sufficient data exists (line 158), uses the attacker-controlled length_of_next_hop field to determine memcpy size (line 181), and computes prefix_length by dereferencing a pointer calculated from multiple attacker-controlled offsets without bounds validation (line 189). The prefix_length is then used to calculate number_of_bytes_required_for_prefix which becomes a memcpy length (line 202) with no check against remaining buffer size.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains multiple out-of-bounds reads in the BGP MP_REACH_NLRI IPv6 attribute decoder. The function decode_mp_reach_ipv6() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp contains a TODO comment at line 156 explicitly acknowledging &amp;#39;we should add sanity checks to avoid reads after attribute memory block.&amp;#39; The function casts raw pointers to structure types without verifying sufficient data exists (line 158), uses the attacker-controlled length_of_next_hop field to determine memcpy size (line 181), and computes prefix_length by dereferencing a pointer calculated from multiple attacker-controlled offsets without bounds validation (line 189). The prefix_length is then used to calculate number_of_bytes_required_for_prefix which becomes a memcpy length (line 202) with no check against remaining buffer size.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-rxgw-72v4-4rvj</guid>
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      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-48688</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-48688</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:25.10: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: fastnetmon&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains multiple out-of-bounds reads in the BGP MP_REACH_NLRI IPv6 attribute decoder. The function decode_mp_reach_ipv6() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp contains a TODO comment at line 156 explicitly acknowledging &amp;#39;we should add sanity checks to avoid reads after attribute memory block.&amp;#39; The function casts raw pointers to structure types without verifying sufficient data exists (line 158), uses the attacker-controlled length_of_next_hop field to determine memcpy size (line 181), and computes prefix_length by dereferencing a pointer calculated from multiple attacker-controlled offsets without bounds validation (line 189). The prefix_length is then used to calculate number_of_bytes_required_for_prefix which becomes a memcpy length (line 202) with no check against remaining buffer size.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:25.10: fastnetmon, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: fastnetmon&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains multiple out-of-bounds reads in the BGP MP_REACH_NLRI IPv6 attribute decoder. The function decode_mp_reach_ipv6() in src/bgp_protocol.cpp contains a TODO comment at line 156 explicitly acknowledging &amp;#39;we should add sanity checks to avoid reads after attribute memory block.&amp;#39; The function casts raw pointers to structure types without verifying sufficient data exists (line 158), uses the attacker-controlled length_of_next_hop field to determine memcpy size (line 181), and computes prefix_length by dereferencing a pointer calculated from multiple attacker-controlled offsets without bounds validation (line 189). The prefix_length is then used to calculate number_of_bytes_required_for_prefix which becomes a memcpy length (line 202) with no check against remaining buffer size.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-48688</guid>
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