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fkie_cve-2026-47686

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to 3.11.6, handleException() in lib/setup-sandbox.js sanitizes SuppressedError.error, SuppressedError.suppressed, and AggregateError.errors but does not sanitize Error.cause, allowing sandbox code to obtain a powerful host object such as process from an embedder-exposed host function that throws an error with that object as its cause and then execute arbitrary host commands. This issue is fixed in version 3.11.6.

GHSA-m283-3h24-438v — VM2 has Missing Error.cause Sanitization that Enables Sandbox Escape to RCE

Affected: npm: vm2

**Affected:** vm2 <= 3.11.3 **CVSS 3.1:** 9.9 HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) **CWE:** CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure) **Prerequisite:** Embedder exposes a host function that throws an Error with `.cause` referencing a powerful host object (e.g., `process`)

## Summary

I found that `handleException()` in `lib/setup-sandbox.js` recursively sanitizes sub-errors for `SuppressedError` and `AggregateError`, but completely ignores the ES2022 `Error.cause` property. When sandbox code catches a host-thrown error carrying a `.cause` that references a host object like `process`, it can traverse that reference to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host.

The project's own `docs/ATTACKS.md` (Defense Invariant #3, line 54) explicitly claims Error.cause is sanitized. The implementation does not match this claim.

## Root Cause

The `handleException` function (lines 869-959 of `lib/setup-sandbox.js`) walks the prototype chain of caught errors looking for `SuppressedError` and `AggregateError`. When it finds them, it recursively sanitizes their contained errors (`.error`, `.suppressed`, `.errors[]`). For all other error types, it returns `e` directly at line 958 without inspecting `.cause`.

```javascript function handleException(e, visited) { e = ensureThis(e); if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e; // ... cycle detection ... while (proto !== null) { if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto)…

RHSA-2026:76788 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Developer Hub 1.10.5 Plugin Catalog GA plugins release.

undici: undici: Information disclosure and Denial of Service via malformed Cache-Control directives undici: undici: Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol vm2: vm2: Denial of Service due to memory allocation limit bypass vm2: vm2: Missing Error.cause Sanitization Enables VM2 Sandbox Escape to RCE vm2: vm2: Sandbox Breakout Using Dangerous Host Proto Mutators urllib: urllib: Credential leakage via cross-origin redirects fast-uri: fast-uri: Server-Side Request Forgery via repeated hostname percent-decoding fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion via skipped IDN canonicalization fast-uri: fast-uri: Server-side request forgery via malformed IPv6 normalization fast-uri: fast-uri: URI parsing flaw enables server-side request forgery and redirects multer: Multer: Denial of Service via file descriptor leak on aborted uploads multer: Multer: Denial of Service via crafted multipart field names jsonata: JSONata: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted JSONata expressions jsonata: JSONata: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted JSONata expressions jsonata: JSONata: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted JSONata expressions multer: Multer: Denial of Service via oversized array index in field names qs: qs: Denial of Service via improper validation in stringify function fast-uri: fast-uri: Authority Injection via Unvalidated Port Serialization js-yaml: js-yaml: Denial of Service vulnerability in YAML parsing fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion via unbalanced URI brackets can bypass sec…