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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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      <title>bdu:2026-07197</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bdu:2026-07197</link>
      <description>bdu:2026-07197</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bdu:2026-07197</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-45395</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45395</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the tool update endpoint (POST /api/v1/tools/id/{id}/update) is missing the workspace.tools permission check that is present on the tool create endpoint. This allows a user who has been explicitly denied tool management capabilities ( and who the administrator considers untrusted for code execution ) to replace a tool&amp;#39;s server-side Python content and trigger execution, bypassing the intended workspace.tools security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.5, the tool update endpoint (POST /api/v1/tools/id/{id}/update) is missing the workspace.tools permission check that is present on the tool create endpoint. This allows a user who has been explicitly denied tool management capabilities ( and who the administrator considers untrusted for code execution ) to replace a tool&amp;#39;s server-side Python content and trigger execution, bypassing the intended workspace.tools security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-45395</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-p4fx-23fq-jfg6 — Open WebUI: Missing `workspace.tools` Authorization Check on Tool Update Endpoint Allows Privilege Escalation to Code E…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-p4fx-23fq-jfg6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The tool update endpoint (`POST /api/v1/tools/id/{id}/update`) is missing the `workspace.tools` permission check that is present on the tool create endpoint. This allows a user who has been explicitly **denied** tool management capabilities ( and who the administrator considers **untrusted** for code execution )  to replace a tool&amp;#39;s server-side Python content and trigger execution, bypassing the intended `workspace.tools` security boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI&amp;#39;s security policy correctly states that `workspace.tools` is the trust boundary for code execution: *&amp;#34;Granting a user the ability to create Tools is equivalent to giving them shell access to the server.&amp;#34;* This vulnerability breaks that boundary. A `write` access grant on a single tool is sufficient to bypass `workspace.tools` entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is **not** a report about exec() being unsandboxed (that is acknowledged as intended behavior). This is a report about a **missing authorization check** that allows an untrusted user to reach the exec() sink that should be gated behind `workspace.tools`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The create and update endpoints for tools have **asymmetric authorization checks**. The create endpoint enforces the `workspace.tools` permission; the update endpoint does not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Create endpoint, enforces `workspace.tools`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File**: `backend/open_webui/routers/tools.py`, lines 326-345&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
@router.post(&amp;#39;/create&amp;#39;, response_model=Optional[ToolResponse])
async def create_new_tools(
    request: Request…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The tool update endpoint (`POST /api/v1/tools/id/{id}/update`) is missing the `workspace.tools` permission check that is present on the tool create endpoint. This allows a user who has been explicitly **denied** tool management capabilities ( and who the administrator considers **untrusted** for code execution )  to replace a tool&amp;#39;s server-side Python content and trigger execution, bypassing the intended `workspace.tools` security boundary.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI&amp;#39;s security policy correctly states that `workspace.tools` is the trust boundary for code execution: *&amp;#34;Granting a user the ability to create Tools is equivalent to giving them shell access to the server.&amp;#34;* This vulnerability breaks that boundary. A `write` access grant on a single tool is sufficient to bypass `workspace.tools` entirely.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is **not** a report about exec() being unsandboxed (that is acknowledged as intended behavior). This is a report about a **missing authorization check** that allows an untrusted user to reach the exec() sink that should be gated behind `workspace.tools`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Root Cause&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The create and update endpoints for tools have **asymmetric authorization checks**. The create endpoint enforces the `workspace.tools` permission; the update endpoint does not.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### Create endpoint, enforces `workspace.tools`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**File**: `backend/open_webui/routers/tools.py`, lines 326-345&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
@router.post(&amp;#39;/create&amp;#39;, response_model=Optional[ToolResponse])
async def create_new_tools(
    request: Request…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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