https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Thu, 01 Oct 2026 21:49:01 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44588 <p>SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, he tooltip mouseover handler in app/src/block/popover.ts reads aria-label via getAttribute and passes it through decodeURIComponent before assigning to messageElement.innerHTML in app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41. The encoder used at the producer side, escapeAriaLabel in app/src/util/escape.ts:19-25, only handles HTML special characters (&#34;, &#39;, &lt;, literal &amp;lt;) — it leaves %XX URL-escapes untouched. So a doc title containing %3Cimg src=x onerror=...%3E round-trips through escapeAriaLabel and the HTML attribute layer unmodified. Then decodeURIComponent on the consumer side converts %3C to a literal &lt; character (a real &lt;, NOT a character reference). When that string is assigned to innerHTML, the HTML5 tokenizer enters TagOpenState on the literal &lt;, parses the &lt;img&gt; element, and the onerror handler fires. Because the renderer runs with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), require(&#39;child_process&#39;) is reachable from the injected handler, escalating to arbitrary code execution.This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.</p> <p>SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, he tooltip mouseover handler in app/src/block/popover.ts reads aria-label via getAttribute and passes it through decodeURIComponent before assigning to messageElement.innerHTML in app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41. The encoder used at the producer side, escapeAriaLabel in app/src/util/escape.ts:19-25, only handles HTML special characters (&#34;, &#39;, &lt;, literal &amp;lt;) — it leaves %XX URL-escapes untouched. So a doc title containing %3Cimg src=x onerror=...%3E round-trips through escapeAriaLabel and the HTML attribute layer unmodified. Then decodeURIComponent on the consumer side converts %3C to a literal &lt; character (a real &lt;, NOT a character reference). When that string is assigned to innerHTML, the HTML5 tokenizer enters TagOpenState on the literal &lt;, parses the &lt;img&gt; element, and the onerror handler fires. Because the renderer runs with nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, webSecurity: false (app/electron/main.js:407-411), require(&#39;child_process&#39;) is reachable from the injected handler, escalating to arbitrary code execution.This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44588 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-25rp-h46x-2hjm <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The tooltip mouseover handler in `app/src/block/popover.ts` reads `aria-label` via `getAttribute` and passes it through `decodeURIComponent` before assigning to `messageElement.innerHTML` in `app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41`. The encoder used at the producer side, `escapeAriaLabel` in `app/src/util/escape.ts:19-25`, only handles HTML special characters (`&#34;`, `&#39;`, `&lt;`, literal `&amp;lt;`) — it leaves `%XX` URL-escapes untouched. So a doc title containing `%3Cimg src=x onerror=...%3E` round-trips through `escapeAriaLabel` and the HTML attribute layer unmodified. Then `decodeURIComponent` on the consumer side converts `%3C` to a literal `&lt;` character (a real `&lt;`, NOT a character reference). When that string is assigned to `innerHTML`, the HTML5 tokenizer enters TagOpenState on the literal `&lt;`, parses the `&lt;img&gt;` element, and the `onerror` handler fires.</p> <p>Because the renderer runs with `nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, webSecurity: false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), `require(&#39;child_process&#39;)` is reachable from the injected handler, escalating to arbitrary code execution.</p> <p>Doc titles, AV column names + descriptions, AV select options, file-tree tooltips all reach this sink because they&#39;re rendered into `class=&#34;ariaLabel&#34;` elements with `aria-label=&#34;${escapeAriaLabel(...)}&#34;`. Doc title is the easiest plant — any user with create/rename access lands the payload, and the file survives `.sy.zip` round-trip without modification.</p> <p>## Why a &#34;double HTML-decode&#34;…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>The tooltip mouseover handler in `app/src/block/popover.ts` reads `aria-label` via `getAttribute` and passes it through `decodeURIComponent` before assigning to `messageElement.innerHTML` in `app/src/dialog/tooltip.ts:41`. The encoder used at the producer side, `escapeAriaLabel` in `app/src/util/escape.ts:19-25`, only handles HTML special characters (`&#34;`, `&#39;`, `&lt;`, literal `&amp;lt;`) — it leaves `%XX` URL-escapes untouched. So a doc title containing `%3Cimg src=x onerror=...%3E` round-trips through `escapeAriaLabel` and the HTML attribute layer unmodified. Then `decodeURIComponent` on the consumer side converts `%3C` to a literal `&lt;` character (a real `&lt;`, NOT a character reference). When that string is assigned to `innerHTML`, the HTML5 tokenizer enters TagOpenState on the literal `&lt;`, parses the `&lt;img&gt;` element, and the `onerror` handler fires.</p> <p>Because the renderer runs with `nodeIntegration: true, contextIsolation: false, webSecurity: false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), `require(&#39;child_process&#39;)` is reachable from the injected handler, escalating to arbitrary code execution.</p> <p>Doc titles, AV column names + descriptions, AV select options, file-tree tooltips all reach this sink because they&#39;re rendered into `class=&#34;ariaLabel&#34;` elements with `aria-label=&#34;${escapeAriaLabel(...)}&#34;`. Doc title is the easiest plant — any user with create/rename access lands the payload, and the file survives `.sy.zip` round-trip without modification.</p> <p>## Why a &#34;double HTML-decode&#34;…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-25rp-h46x-2hjm