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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-44424</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44424</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ShellHub is a centralized SSH gateway. Prior to 0.24.2, GET /api/devices/:uid returns the full device object whenever the caller is authenticated, without verifying that the device belongs to the caller&amp;#39;s namespace (tenant). Any authenticated user (JWT or API Key) who knows or can guess a device UID can read device metadata from any other namespace. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.24.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ShellHub is a centralized SSH gateway. Prior to 0.24.2, GET /api/devices/:uid returns the full device object whenever the caller is authenticated, without verifying that the device belongs to the caller&amp;#39;s namespace (tenant). Any authenticated user (JWT or API Key) who knows or can guess a device UID can read device metadata from any other namespace. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.24.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-44424</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j72x-xfwg-783f — ShellHub has cross-tenant IDOR in `GET /api/devices/:uid` that discloses device data of any namespace</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-j72x-xfwg-783f</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/shellhub-io/shellhub&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
`GET /api/devices/:uid` returns the full device object whenever the caller is authenticated, without verifying that the device belongs to the caller&amp;#39;s namespace (tenant). Any authenticated user (JWT or API Key) who knows or can guess a device UID can read device metadata from any other namespace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity
**CVSS 3.1: 7.5 (High)** 
CWE-639 — Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions
ShellHub Community v0.24.1 (validated). Likely all prior versions that share this handler.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause
`api/services/device.go:97-104` — `GetDevice` resolves the device by UID without scoping to the caller&amp;#39;s tenant:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
  func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
      device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid))
      // ⚠️ missing: s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant)
      ...
  }
  ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Compare with `DeleteDevice` in the same file (line 137) which correctly applies `InNamespace(tenant)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `Authorize` middleware (`api/routes/middleware/authorize.go:12-27`) only checks that a tenant is present in the context — not that the resource belongs to that tenant.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of concept (validated live against v0.24.1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pre-requisite: attacker has any valid user account and knows a target `tenant_id` (UUIDs frequently leak via UI URLs, email invites, support channels, or prior namespace membership).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
  ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/login…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/shellhub-io/shellhub&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
`GET /api/devices/:uid` returns the full device object whenever the caller is authenticated, without verifying that the device belongs to the caller&amp;#39;s namespace (tenant). Any authenticated user (JWT or API Key) who knows or can guess a device UID can read device metadata from any other namespace.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Severity
**CVSS 3.1: 7.5 (High)** 
CWE-639 — Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions
ShellHub Community v0.24.1 (validated). Likely all prior versions that share this handler.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause
`api/services/device.go:97-104` — `GetDevice` resolves the device by UID without scoping to the caller&amp;#39;s tenant:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
  func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
      device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid))
      // ⚠️ missing: s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant)
      ...
  }
  ```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Compare with `DeleteDevice` in the same file (line 137) which correctly applies `InNamespace(tenant)`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `Authorize` middleware (`api/routes/middleware/authorize.go:12-27`) only checks that a tenant is present in the context — not that the resource belongs to that tenant.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Proof of concept (validated live against v0.24.1)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pre-requisite: attacker has any valid user account and knows a target `tenant_id` (UUIDs frequently leak via UI URLs, email invites, support channels, or prior namespace membership).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
  ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/login…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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