<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:03:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-42890</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42890</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Actual is an open-source personal finance application. In the macOS desktop application version 25.x (built on Electron 39.2.7), the ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse is not disabled, allowing an attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments to invoke the signed Actual.app binary with the ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 environment variable set. This converts the application into a Node.js REPL capable of executing arbitrary code that inherits the application&amp;#39;s entitlements and code signature, bypassing macOS Gatekeeper review. Version 26.5.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Actual is an open-source personal finance application. In the macOS desktop application version 25.x (built on Electron 39.2.7), the ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse is not disabled, allowing an attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments to invoke the signed Actual.app binary with the ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 environment variable set. This converts the application into a Node.js REPL capable of executing arbitrary code that inherits the application&amp;#39;s entitlements and code signature, bypassing macOS Gatekeeper review. Version 26.5.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-42890</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7rvm-xjpp-63r9 — actual Allows Electron to Run As Node</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-7rvm-xjpp-63r9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: actual&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A electron run as node vulnerability was identified in `actual` (macOS application, version `25.x (Electron 39.2.7)`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerability Type:** Electron Run As Node&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse enabled (Electron 39.2.7) — app can be converted to Node.js REPL for arbitrary code execution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments can invoke the signed Actual.app binary with ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 to execute arbitrary Node.js code inheriting the apps entitlements and code signature. This bypasses macOS Gatekeeper review of the payload: the Node.js script runs as Actual, under Actuals bundle ID and signed identity, and has access to any entitlements the app carries (network, file access, keychain, automation). Combined with any downloader (browser, mail attachment, Slack link) this becomes a signed-binary-abuse primitive on every Mac with Actual installed.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: actual&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A electron run as node vulnerability was identified in `actual` (macOS application, version `25.x (Electron 39.2.7)`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerability Type:** Electron Run As Node&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Description&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse enabled (Electron 39.2.7) — app can be converted to Node.js REPL for arbitrary code execution&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments can invoke the signed Actual.app binary with ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 to execute arbitrary Node.js code inheriting the apps entitlements and code signature. This bypasses macOS Gatekeeper review of the payload: the Node.js script runs as Actual, under Actuals bundle ID and signed identity, and has access to any entitlements the app carries (network, file access, keychain, automation). Combined with any downloader (browser, mail attachment, Slack link) this becomes a signed-binary-abuse primitive on every Mac with Actual installed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-7rvm-xjpp-63r9</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
