https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 11:51:42 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-29794 <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.8 and prior to version 2.2.0, unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application&#39;s built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`. Unauthenticated users can abuse endpoints available to them for different potential impacts. The immediate concern would be brute-forcing usernames or specific accounts&#39; passwords. This bypass allows unlimited requests against unauthenticated endpoints. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.</p> <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.8 and prior to version 2.2.0, unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application&#39;s built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`. Unauthenticated users can abuse endpoints available to them for different potential impacts. The immediate concern would be brute-forcing usernames or specific accounts&#39; passwords. This bypass allows unlimited requests against unauthenticated endpoints. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-29794 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m547-hp4w-j6jx <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: code.vikunja.io/api</p> <p>### Summary Unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application&#39;s built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`.</p> <p>### Details In the first file below, the rate-limit for unauthenticated users can be observed being populated with the `ip` value. In the second file, it shows it using the `c.RealIP()` function for the `ip` case. Due to this, the rate-limit will rely on the value of one of the two mentioned headers (`X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP`). These can be spoofed by users client-side in order to completely bypass any unauthenticated rate-limits in place.</p> <p>Some reverse proxies like Traefik will overwrite this value by default, but others will not, leaving any deployment that either isn&#39;t using a reserve proxy that specifically overwrites the header&#39;s value or isn&#39;t using a reverse proxy vulnerable.</p> <p>**File 1:** pkg\routes\routes.go:318 ```go // This is the group with no auth // It is its own group to be able to rate limit this based on different heuristics n := a.Group(&#34;&#34;) setupRateLimit(n, &#34;ip&#34;)</p> <p>// Docs n.GET(&#34;/docs.json&#34;, apiv1.DocsJSON) n.GET(&#34;/docs&#34;, apiv1.RedocUI)</p> <p>// Prometheus endpoint setupMetrics(n)</p> <p>// Separate route for unauthenticated routes to enable rate limits for it ur := a.Group(&#34;&#34;) rate := limiter.Rate{ Period: 60 * time.Second, Limit: config.RateLimitNoAuthRoutesLimit.GetInt64(), } rateLimiter := createRateLimiter(rate) ur.Use…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: code.vikunja.io/api</p> <p>### Summary Unauthenticated users are able to bypass the application&#39;s built-in rate-limits by spoofing the `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP` headers due to the rate-limit relying on the value of `(echo.Context).RealIP`.</p> <p>### Details In the first file below, the rate-limit for unauthenticated users can be observed being populated with the `ip` value. In the second file, it shows it using the `c.RealIP()` function for the `ip` case. Due to this, the rate-limit will rely on the value of one of the two mentioned headers (`X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP`). These can be spoofed by users client-side in order to completely bypass any unauthenticated rate-limits in place.</p> <p>Some reverse proxies like Traefik will overwrite this value by default, but others will not, leaving any deployment that either isn&#39;t using a reserve proxy that specifically overwrites the header&#39;s value or isn&#39;t using a reverse proxy vulnerable.</p> <p>**File 1:** pkg\routes\routes.go:318 ```go // This is the group with no auth // It is its own group to be able to rate limit this based on different heuristics n := a.Group(&#34;&#34;) setupRateLimit(n, &#34;ip&#34;)</p> <p>// Docs n.GET(&#34;/docs.json&#34;, apiv1.DocsJSON) n.GET(&#34;/docs&#34;, apiv1.RedocUI)</p> <p>// Prometheus endpoint setupMetrics(n)</p> <p>// Separate route for unauthenticated routes to enable rate limits for it ur := a.Group(&#34;&#34;) rate := limiter.Rate{ Period: 60 * time.Second, Limit: config.RateLimitNoAuthRoutesLimit.GetInt64(), } rateLimiter := createRateLimiter(rate) ur.Use…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m547-hp4w-j6jx