https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 25 Oct 2026 23:50:41 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19741 <p>Zephyr&#39;s OpenThread integration defined CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD with default &#34;J01NME&#34; in modules/openthread/Kconfig.thread (previously subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig, then subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig.thread). J01NME is the example Joining Device Credential used throughout the public OpenThread and Thread commissioning documentation, including Zephyr&#39;s own samples/net/sockets/echo_client/README.rst, so it is not a secret. A firmware image built with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART=y that never overrode the PSKd therefore shipped with a publicly known joining credential compiled in, with no build-time or run-time warning.</p> <p>The PSKd is the only value that authenticates Thread commissioning: joiner and commissioner run a DTLS-PSK handshake keyed on it, after which the commissioner supplies the full operational dataset. In ot_configure_instance() (modules/openthread/openthread.c), a device with no stored dataset calls otJoinerStart() with the configured PSKd, and ot_joiner_start_handler() calls otThreadSetEnabled() on success. An unauthenticated attacker within 802.15.4 radio range of an uncommissioned device (factory-fresh, after a factory reset, or after a settings erase) can run any stock Thread commissioner registered with J01NME, complete the handshake, and hand the device an attacker-controlled operational dataset.</p> <p>The device then joins and enables Thread on the attacker&#39;s mesh. The attacker becomes its router, seeing, dropping, injecting and spoofing all o…</p> <p>Zephyr&#39;s OpenThread integration defined CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_PSKD with default &#34;J01NME&#34; in modules/openthread/Kconfig.thread (previously subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig, then subsys/net/l2/openthread/Kconfig.thread). J01NME is the example Joining Device Credential used throughout the public OpenThread and Thread commissioning documentation, including Zephyr&#39;s own samples/net/sockets/echo_client/README.rst, so it is not a secret. A firmware image built with CONFIG_OPENTHREAD_JOINER_AUTOSTART=y that never overrode the PSKd therefore shipped with a publicly known joining credential compiled in, with no build-time or run-time warning.</p> <p>The PSKd is the only value that authenticates Thread commissioning: joiner and commissioner run a DTLS-PSK handshake keyed on it, after which the commissioner supplies the full operational dataset. In ot_configure_instance() (modules/openthread/openthread.c), a device with no stored dataset calls otJoinerStart() with the configured PSKd, and ot_joiner_start_handler() calls otThreadSetEnabled() on success. An unauthenticated attacker within 802.15.4 radio range of an uncommissioned device (factory-fresh, after a factory reset, or after a settings erase) can run any stock Thread commissioner registered with J01NME, complete the handshake, and hand the device an attacker-controlled operational dataset.</p> <p>The device then joins and enables Thread on the attacker&#39;s mesh. The attacker becomes its router, seeing, dropping, injecting and spoofing all o…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19741