<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 10:26:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-19579</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19579</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT before 8.6.0 contains an authorization bypass (insecure direct object reference) in the asset checkout-request cancellation endpoint. The cancel_by_admin and requestingUser values are read from user-controlled URL path segments and used without a server-side authorization check, so any authenticated, low-privileged user can supply a non-empty cancel_by_admin value to bypass the request-ownership check and cancel another user&amp;#39;s pending checkout request. Because asset and user identifiers are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to cancel every pending checkout request, disrupting the asset-request workflow. This is fixed in Snipe-IT 8.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT before 8.6.0 contains an authorization bypass (insecure direct object reference) in the asset checkout-request cancellation endpoint. The cancel_by_admin and requestingUser values are read from user-controlled URL path segments and used without a server-side authorization check, so any authenticated, low-privileged user can supply a non-empty cancel_by_admin value to bypass the request-ownership check and cancel another user&amp;#39;s pending checkout request. Because asset and user identifiers are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to cancel every pending checkout request, disrupting the asset-request workflow. This is fixed in Snipe-IT 8.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19579</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9g74-jcx5-95fc</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-9g74-jcx5-95fc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT before 8.6.0 contains an authorization bypass (insecure direct object reference) in the asset checkout-request cancellation endpoint. The cancel_by_admin and requestingUser values are read from user-controlled URL path segments and used without a server-side authorization check, so any authenticated, low-privileged user can supply a non-empty cancel_by_admin value to bypass the request-ownership check and cancel another user&amp;#39;s pending checkout request. Because asset and user identifiers are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to cancel every pending checkout request, disrupting the asset-request workflow. This is fixed in Snipe-IT 8.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT before 8.6.0 contains an authorization bypass (insecure direct object reference) in the asset checkout-request cancellation endpoint. The cancel_by_admin and requestingUser values are read from user-controlled URL path segments and used without a server-side authorization check, so any authenticated, low-privileged user can supply a non-empty cancel_by_admin value to bypass the request-ownership check and cancel another user&amp;#39;s pending checkout request. Because asset and user identifiers are sequential integers, an attacker can enumerate them to cancel every pending checkout request, disrupting the asset-request workflow. This is fixed in Snipe-IT 8.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-9g74-jcx5-95fc</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
