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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-15162</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-15162</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Object Sync for Salesforce plugin is vulnerable to unauthenticated SQL Injection via the wordpress_object_type parameter of its /wp-json/object-sync-for-salesforce/push/ REST route. The route&amp;#39;s permission callback (can_process()) checks only the HTTP method for the push class — no capability or nonce — so it is reachable by unauthenticated users. The wordpress_object_type value is concatenated directly into a SQL query (post_type = &amp;#34;$object_type&amp;#34;, class-object-sync-sf-wordpress.php:328) and executed via $wpdb-&amp;gt;get_results() with no $wpdb-&amp;gt;prepare() (:578). Because REST body parameters are not magic-quoted, an attacker can break out of the quoted string and inject arbitrary SQL. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries (time-based blind), enabling extraction of sensitive information such as password hashes from the database. Only a valid wordpress_id (e.g. 1) is required — no authentication or Salesforce connection.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Object Sync for Salesforce plugin is vulnerable to unauthenticated SQL Injection via the wordpress_object_type parameter of its /wp-json/object-sync-for-salesforce/push/ REST route. The route&amp;#39;s permission callback (can_process()) checks only the HTTP method for the push class — no capability or nonce — so it is reachable by unauthenticated users. The wordpress_object_type value is concatenated directly into a SQL query (post_type = &amp;#34;$object_type&amp;#34;, class-object-sync-sf-wordpress.php:328) and executed via $wpdb-&amp;gt;get_results() with no $wpdb-&amp;gt;prepare() (:578). Because REST body parameters are not magic-quoted, an attacker can break out of the quoted string and inject arbitrary SQL. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries (time-based blind), enabling extraction of sensitive information such as password hashes from the database. Only a valid wordpress_id (e.g. 1) is required — no authentication or Salesforce connection.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>GHSA-5x6m-wm6g-mfv9</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5x6m-wm6g-mfv9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Object Sync for Salesforce plugin is vulnerable to unauthenticated SQL Injection via the wordpress_object_type parameter of its /wp-json/object-sync-for-salesforce/push/ REST route. The route&amp;#39;s permission callback (can_process()) checks only the HTTP method for the push class — no capability or nonce — so it is reachable by unauthenticated users. The wordpress_object_type value is concatenated directly into a SQL query (post_type = &amp;#34;$object_type&amp;#34;, class-object-sync-sf-wordpress.php:328) and executed via $wpdb-&amp;gt;get_results() with no $wpdb-&amp;gt;prepare() (:578). Because REST body parameters are not magic-quoted, an attacker can break out of the quoted string and inject arbitrary SQL. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries (time-based blind), enabling extraction of sensitive information such as password hashes from the database. Only a valid wordpress_id (e.g. 1) is required — no authentication or Salesforce connection.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Object Sync for Salesforce plugin is vulnerable to unauthenticated SQL Injection via the wordpress_object_type parameter of its /wp-json/object-sync-for-salesforce/push/ REST route. The route&amp;#39;s permission callback (can_process()) checks only the HTTP method for the push class — no capability or nonce — so it is reachable by unauthenticated users. The wordpress_object_type value is concatenated directly into a SQL query (post_type = &amp;#34;$object_type&amp;#34;, class-object-sync-sf-wordpress.php:328) and executed via $wpdb-&amp;gt;get_results() with no $wpdb-&amp;gt;prepare() (:578). Because REST body parameters are not magic-quoted, an attacker can break out of the quoted string and inject arbitrary SQL. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to append additional SQL queries (time-based blind), enabling extraction of sensitive information such as password hashes from the database. Only a valid wordpress_id (e.g. 1) is required — no authentication or Salesforce connection.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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