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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 07:36:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-129237</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129237</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;qbee-agent is the device agent component of the qbee.io IoT device management platform. Prior to 2026.41, the unpackTar extraction logic in app/utils/tar.go validates cleaned archive entry paths with strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) without enforcing a path-separator boundary. When UseContext enables the Docker Compose build context path in app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go, a less-privileged archive supplier with delegated configuration and/or file-manager access can provide a sibling-prefix traversal entry that passes the check, causing utils.UnpackTar to create directories and regular files outside the intended context extraction directory with qbee-agent process privileges, despite the supplier lacking authority to write those sibling files. In deployments where only full device or fleet administrators can provide Docker Compose context archives, this behavior is hardening rather than a crossed security boundary. The demonstrated impact is limited to nearby cache or project paths sharing the destination prefix, may affect integrity or availability of qbee-agent-managed Docker Compose state, and does not establish arbitrary absolute-path writes or direct code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2026.41.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;qbee-agent is the device agent component of the qbee.io IoT device management platform. Prior to 2026.41, the unpackTar extraction logic in app/utils/tar.go validates cleaned archive entry paths with strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) without enforcing a path-separator boundary. When UseContext enables the Docker Compose build context path in app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go, a less-privileged archive supplier with delegated configuration and/or file-manager access can provide a sibling-prefix traversal entry that passes the check, causing utils.UnpackTar to create directories and regular files outside the intended context extraction directory with qbee-agent process privileges, despite the supplier lacking authority to write those sibling files. In deployments where only full device or fleet administrators can provide Docker Compose context archives, this behavior is hardening rather than a crossed security boundary. The demonstrated impact is limited to nearby cache or project paths sharing the destination prefix, may affect integrity or availability of qbee-agent-managed Docker Compose state, and does not establish arbitrary absolute-path writes or direct code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2026.41.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129237</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vx32-xf7g-9ghr — qbee-agent: Docker Compose build context Zip Slip writes outside context directory</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-vx32-xf7g-9ghr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: go.qbee.io/agent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`qbee-agent` contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in `app/utils/tar.go`. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is `/tmp/.../context`, a tar entry such as `../context-outside/payload.txt` cleans to `/tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt` and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when `UseContext` is enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Code references below were verified against `qbee-io/qbee-agent` commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected repository:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `qbee-io/qbee-agent`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected files:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go`
- Docker Compose context path in `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable extraction code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go:89-93`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
targetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))
destdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {
    return fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s&amp;#34;, targetPath, destdirClean)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The file is then created at the accepted `targetPath`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go:96-109`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
case tar.TypeDir:
    if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {
        return err
    }
cas…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: go.qbee.io/agent&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`qbee-agent` contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in `app/utils/tar.go`. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is `/tmp/.../context`, a tar entry such as `../context-outside/payload.txt` cleans to `/tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt` and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when `UseContext` is enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Code references below were verified against `qbee-io/qbee-agent` commit:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected repository:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `qbee-io/qbee-agent`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected files:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go`
- Docker Compose context path in `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable extraction code:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go:89-93`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
targetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))
destdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {
    return fmt.Errorf(&amp;#34;tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s&amp;#34;, targetPath, destdirClean)
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The file is then created at the accepted `targetPath`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `app/utils/tar.go:96-109`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
case tar.TypeDir:
    if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {
        return err
    }
cas…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-vx32-xf7g-9ghr</guid>
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